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Max Weber on Property: 
An Effort in Interpretive Understanding 
 





I.  Introduction: 
Property and Organized Social Relationships, in Three Phases 
 
Throughout the academic world, renewed interest in property and “property rights” is evident.  
Within certain economic quarters, the writings of Ronald Coase have been responsible for something 
approaching a paradigm shift,1 with a focus on property rights and “transaction costs” in their exchange at 
the core.2  Although discussion of property has been fundamental to political theory since its inception, 
widespread application of “neo-liberal” principles in the context of international development finance – 
which have emphasized the importance of stable, private property rights – has motivated political 
scientists, development economists, and public policy theorists to direct increasing attention to property-
rights regimes.3  Within legal science, property sits at the heart of continental and common-law legal 
systems, as well as legal systems that these property-based systems have influenced.  Within the social 
sciences, recent attention to property is evident in anthropology and economic sociology.4
                                                     
∗   J.D., LL.M., M.P.A., Doctoral Candidate, Sociology, Cornell University.  I wish to thank Richard Swedberg, 
Martin Schroeder, and Mark Vail for helpful and encouraging comments and suggestions. 
 
1    See THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (3d ed. 1996) (1962). 
2   See PROPERTY RIGHTS: COOPERATION, CONFLICT, AND LAW (Terry L. Anderson & Fred McChesney eds. 2003) 
(hereinafter “PROPERTY RIGHTS”); YORAM BARZEL, A THEORY OF THE STATE: ECONOMIC RIGHTS, LEGAL RIGHTS, 
AND THE SCOPE OF THE STATE (2002); ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE 
DISPUTES (1991); ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE 
ACTION (1990); YORAM BARZEL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS (2d ed. 1997) (1989); R. H. Coase, 
THE FIRM, THE MARKET AND THE LAW (1988); DOUGLASS C. NORTH, STRUCTURE AND CHANGE IN ECONOMIC 
HISTORY (1981). 
 Some readers might question the validity of characterizing these developments as a “paradigm shift” in 
Kuhn’s sense.  In response to such doubts, it is worth noting that, throughout The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 
Kuhn repeatedly stated that paradigm shifts need not occur on a macro scale in order to be so characterized, but 
rather more typically appear as regularized, small-scale changes in the basic conceptual commitments within a 
community of scientific practitioners.  See e.g. KUHN, supra note 1, at 6-7, 180-81.  Indeed, it would not be difficult 
to describe the transition to an economic “property rights” paradigm in Kuhnian terms.  Such an account would 
describe a crisis in the “normal science” of neoclassical economics provoked by problems of “public goods” and 
“externalities,” and the increasing “recognition” that a conception of private property rights, or “ownership,” 
underlies the neoclassical economics paradigm.  For an exceptionally clear statement of this, see Harold Demsetz, 
Ownership and the Externality Problem, in PROPERTY RIGHTS, at 282-300. 
3   See, e.g., Jean Rogers, Property, Power and Growth (Center for International Private Enterprise 2003), available 
at http://www.cipe.org/pdf/publications/fs/jeanrogers.pdf; HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL (2000).  
Moreover, the ascendance of “rational choice theory” perspectives in political science has led to increasing 
interchange among “property rights” scholars in political science and economics.  See, e.g., William H. Riker & Itai 
Sened, A Political Theory of the Origin of Property Rights: Airport Slots, 35 AM. J. POL. SCI. 951 (1991). 
4   See Neil Fligstein & Jennifer Choo, Law and Corporate Governance, 1 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 61 (2005); 
Annelise Riles, Property as Legal Knowledge: Means and Ends, 10 J. ROY. ANTHROP. INST. LAW 775 (2004); 
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 In the case of contemporary sociology, however, the subject of property has been generally 
neglected until quite recently, as Richard Swedberg has noted.5  Even the recent discussions of property 
within economic sociology, moreover, have not focused on the sociological nature of property, but have 
rather focused on its effects, viewing it in a manner generally consistent with neo-institutional economic 
theory.6  This is true despite the fact that Emile Durkheim and Max Weber both devoted considerable 
attention to the nature of property in their published works.7
 The purpose of this article will be to explore Max Weber’s writings on property, in an effort to 
trace the development of his thinking on the subject and to identify whether coherent sociological themes 
emerge.  This is an immensely challenging task.  References to property are pervasive throughout 
Weber’s work, from his dissertation to the compilation that is Economy and Society.
 
8
                                                                                                                                                                           
ANTHROPOLOGY, AND THE CONSTITUTION OF THE SOCIAL: MAKING PERSONS AND THINGS (Alain Pottage & Martha 
Mundy eds. 2004); Victor Nee & Yang Cao, Path Dependent Societal Transformation: Stratification in Hybrid 
Mixed Economies, 28 THEORY & SOC’Y 799 (1999); PROPERTY RELATIONS: RENEWING THE ANTHROPOLOGICAL 
TRADITION (C.M. Hann ed. 1998); Victor Nee & Peng Lian, Sleeping With the Enemy: A Dynamic Model of 
Declining Political Commitment in State Socialism, 23 THEORY & SOC’Y 253 (1994). 
  Moreover, the 
subject of property goes to the heart of Weber’s multiple areas of expertise: law, economics, public 
administration, and sociology.  Thus the investigator is faced with Weber at the pinnacle of his precision 
and subtlety.  For a person educated in the 21st Century, these difficulties are compounded by the 
5    RICHARD SWEDBERG, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY 203 (2003); see also ALVIN GOULDNER, THE 
COMING CRISIS OF WESTERN SOCIOLOGY 304-13 (1970).  One important exception is Jens Beckert, who has recently 
published work on the sociology of inheritance law, as well as a number of other property-related topics.  See JENS 
BECKERT, INHERITED WEALTH (2008) (originally published in German as UNVERDIENTES VERMÖGEN: SOZIOLOGIE 
DES ERBRECHTS (2004)); The Longue Durée of Inheritance Law: Discourses and Institutional Development in 
France, Germany, and the United States, 48 ARCHIVES EUROPÉENNES DE SOCIOLOGIE (2007).  For a recent review 
article, which reinforces the point that property has been generally neglected in contemporary sociology, while also 
formulating certain prescriptions for future sociological work, see Bruce G. Carruthers & Laura Ariovich, The 
Sociology of Property Rights, 30 ANN. SOC. REV. 23 (2004).   
It is important to note that James Coleman’s theoretical work has generally emphasized the importance of 
“resources” and “rights,” and thus may constitute a significant exception to the argument that contemporary 
sociological theory has tended to ignore property.  See, e.g., JAMES S. COLEMAN, FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL THEORY 
(Harvard Paperback ed. 1994) (1990).  Coleman’s theoretical work has been heavily influenced by rational choice 
theory, especially economic theory.  See id.  Thus his emphasis on property is very likely a reflection of the overall 
developments in economic theory that are described supra in note 2.  Ronald Coase and other founders of the 
“property rights” perspective in economic theory are cited liberally throughout his theoretical work, and the 
paradigmatic problems of “free ridership” and “externality” are correspondingly emphasized.  See id. at 27-64. 
6   See, e.g., THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN SOCIOLOGY (Mary C. Brinton & Victor Nee eds. 1998). 
7   See EMILE DURKHEIM, PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND CIVIC MORALS 121-70 (Cornelia Brookfield trans., 2d ed., 
1992) (1957); EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY (Free Press Paperback ed. 1997) (1893).  The 
writings of Max Weber on property will be discussed infra. 
8   MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE OF INTERPRETIVE SOCIOLOGY (Guenther Roth & Claus 
Wittich eds., University of California Press 1978) (1968).  For discussions of the compilation and its contents, see 
RICHARD SWEDBERG, MAX WEBER AND THE IDEA OF ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY 153-62, 197-203 (1998); compare 
Overview of the Text of Economy and Society by the Editors of the Max Weber Gesamtausgabe, 1 MAX WEBER 
STUDIES 104 (2000) with Hiroshi Orihara, From a Torso with a Wrong Head to Five Disjointed Body-Parts Without 
a Head: A Critique of the Editorial Policy for Max Weber Gesamtausgabe I/22, 3 MAX WEBER STUDIES 133 (2003).  
See also infra notes 223 to 230 and accompanying text. 
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challenge of understanding detailed analogies and distinctions drawn by Weber, as a late 19th-Century 
thinker, among (1) his contemporary German-Prussian socio-legal framework, (2) multiple medieval 
socio-legal frameworks, and (3) ancient socio-legal frameworks, particularly those of Greece and Rome.  
From a purely legal (“doctrinal”) perspective, such a task seems virtually impossible, since the law in 
question includes property, contract, bankruptcy, corporations, public administrative law, and family law, 
as well as jurisprudential theory.   
 However, from his first dissertation, Weber was explicit in stating that his interest was not 
primarily doctrinal (or “dogmatic,”9 to use his terminology), nor was it historical, in the sense of merely 
describing the commercial-historical developments that paralleled particular legal frameworks.10
 Yet, precisely for these reasons, there is much to be learned from Weber’s writings on property.  
His writings spanned an enormous historical range, and took account of German jurisprudential, 
economic and social-historical thought at its peak.  His professors and advisors included many leading 
figures in German jurisprudence, economics, and public administration, including Levin Goldschmidt,
  Thus 
one cannot simply rely on legal texts or commercial-historical facts in trying to understand Weber’s 
arguments.  The necessity of interpreting Weber’s German, as well as his Latin and Romance legal 
sources, from an English-speaking perspective further complicates matters.  Such difficulties demand 
caution from any interpreter, and create myriad opportunities for mistaken inferences and conclusions. 
11 
Theodor Mommsen (1817-1903), 12  and August Meitzen (1822-1910). 13
                                                     
9   In German legal literature, the term “dogmatic” generally denotes the binding nature of a legally authoritative text.  
See, e.g. FRANZ WIEACKER, A HISTORY OF PRIVATE LAW IN EUROPE WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO GERMANY 
34 (Tony Weir trans. 1995) (originally published as PRIVATRECHTSGESCHICHTE DER NEUZEIT, rev’d ed. 1967) 
(1952). 
  Moreover, as will become 
10   See MAX WEBER, ZUR GESCHICHTE DER HANDELSGESELLSCHAFTEN IM MITTELALTER, as published in MAX 
WEBER, GESAMMELTE AUFSÄTZE ZUR SOZIAL- UND WIRTSCHAFTS-GESCHICHTE 312 (1924) (hereinafter 
“Handelsgesellschaften”).  The definitive edition of this text has recently been published in German as part of the 
overarching Max Weber Gesamtausgabe project.  See MAX WEBER GESAMTAUSGABE, ZUR GESCHICHTE DER 
HANDELSGESELLSCHAFTEN IM MITTELALTER (Gerhard Dilcher & Susanne Lepsius eds.) (2008).  The scholarly 
introductions written by the editors for each volume in the Max Weber Gesamtausgabe series are invaluable sources 
for understanding the particular texts in their historical context and in relation to Weber’s other works.   
11   Goldschmidt was Weber’s primary advisor and mentor in writing his first dissertation.  See infra notes 18 to 29 
and accompanying text. 
12  According to the Nobel Foundation, which in 1902 awarded him a Nobel Prize in Literature, Theodor Mommsen 
was “the greatest classical historian of the Nineteenth Century.”  See The Nobel Foundation, Nobel Prizes by Year, 
The Nobel Prize in Literature 1902, available at 
http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/literature/laureates/1902/mommsen-bio.html.  Mommsen’s most frequently cited 
work is his multivolume History of Rome, a work which is still in print today.  However, he is credited with 
authoring or editing over 1500 works, including a number of invaluable primary sources in Roman law and social 
history.  His degrees were in law and history; at University of Berlin he was a member of the faculty of law.  See 
ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 576-77 (1937, Volume X). 
13   Meitzen was an agrarian historian and statistician.  See ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 302 (1937, 
Volume X).  He had acquired distinction through his services to the Prussian state, first in conducting an exhaustive 
study of Prussian agriculture and land-taxes, then through his labors in the administration’s statistical bureau.  See id.  
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evident, much of contemporary property theory was prefigured in Weber’s writing.  Thus he is relevant 
both historically and contemporarily.  For these reasons, despite the enormous challenges involved, this 
article will seek to draw much-deserved attention to Weber’s work on property.   
 Weber’s scholarly work pertaining to property will be presented here as proceeding in three 
distinct phases: (1) the legal phase of his first dissertation, in which he first defined property in socio-
relational terms and articulated a number of themes to which he would return in later work; (2) the 
economic-historical phase, in which he articulated a narrative of fundamental historical change in 
proprietary social relationships, bringing into bold relief the character of agrarian property and the 
contrasting character of commercial property; and (3) the sociological phase, in which Weber drew on the 
two prior phases to articulate a sociological theory of property.  The notion that Weber’s property-related 
work proceeded in three clearly-defined phases is distortive; legal, historical, economic, and social 
elements are present from the beginning of his work, and blended throughout his work in interesting ways.  
Nevertheless, the distortion does enable a developmental understanding of the ways that Weber 
conceptualized and analyzed property.   
 This developmental image of Weber’s property-related scholarly work reveals the extent to which 
his finally-developed, sociological theory of property built on insights from his legal and economic-
historical phases.  As the reader will see, Weber presented property as a phenomenon dependent on 
organized social relationships that are to some extent closed to outside participants.  This conception was 
legally and historically articulated in the first dissertation.  In Economy and Society, this conception was 
sociologically formulated and systematically connected to additional important concepts, particularly that 
of “Order.”  A developmental presentation reveals the extent to which Weber’s property-related concepts 
were systematically and meticulously constructed over the course of his lifetime.  The fact that he could 
return to insights from his early scholarship in articulating his sociological theory of property 
demonstrates the strength of the legal and economic-historical foundation he built.  It is to that foundation 
that we now turn.      
 
 
II. The Legal Phase: The First Dissertation. 
Property and Organized Social Relationships 
 
 Translated literally, Weber’s first dissertation has a descriptive, albeit complex, title: 
“Development of the Solidary-Liability-Principle and the Separate-Property-Fund of the Public 
Mercantile-Association from the Household-and-Craft-Industry-Communities in the Italian Cities” 
                                                                                                                                                                           
His History, Theory, and Technique of Statistics (1891) has been translated by Roland P. Falkner and is currently 
available in a paperback reprint edition (BiblioLife).  See also infra note 107. 
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(hereinafter the “Dissertation”).14  Weber successfully defended the Dissertation in 1889,15 and in the 
same year published it as the third chapter in a larger work, 16  which he titled On the History of 
Mercantile-Associations in the Middle Ages (hereinafter “The History of Mercantile-Associations”).17  
Weber’s dissertation chair (Doktorvater), a professor whose seminar had inspired him to begin his 
research two years previously, was Levin Goldschmidt, a renowned commercial law scholar. 18
 Since the 1950’s, U.S. commercial law has been dominated by the Uniform Commercial Code 
(referred to as the “UCC”).  One of the core principles enshrined in the UCC – a principle that U.S. first-
year law students learn as a matter of sacred doctrine – is deference to “trade usages” (i.e. commercial 
customs),
  The 
significance of this fact may be more fully appreciated once Goldschmidt’s scholarship is approached 
from a contemporary U.S. legal perspective.   
19 which are used to interpret the language of commercial agreements and to fill gaps in those 
agreements. 20  Although the UCC’s final text is a result of legislative compromise, its foundational 
principles (and much of its text) were provided by Karl Llewellyn, a German-American law professor 
with a deep understanding of Continental-European legal thought.21  As James Whitman has persuasively 
argued, Llewellyn’s abiding respect for “trade usages” was likely influenced by Levin Goldschmidt, who 
as a participant in the drafting of the 1861 German Commercial Code (Deutsche Handels-Gesetzbuch) 
had argued that “[u]nconditional free play for custom is a cardinal point of view for the desired new 
phase of commercial law.”22
                                                     
14    Entwickelung des Solidarhaftprinzips und des Sondervermögens der offenen Handelsgesellschaft aus den 
Haushalts- und Gewerbegemeinschaften in den italienischen Städten.  See DIRK KÄSLER, MAX WEBER: AN 
INTRODUCTION TO HIS LIFE AND WORK 243 (Philippa Hurd trans. 1988) (originally published as EINFÜHRUNG IN 
DAS STUDIUM MAX WEBERS 1979). 
   
15   See LUTZ KÄLBER, THE HISTORY OF COMMERCIAL PARTNERSHIPS IN THE MIDDLE AGES 9-10 (2003); KÄSLER, 
supra note 14, at 6. 
16   See KÄLBER, supra note 15, at 9-10.   
17   See supra note 10. 
18   See KÄLBER, supra note 15, at 6-10. 
19   See, e.g., UCC § 1-102(2)(b) (“Underlying purposes and policies of this Act are…to permit the continued 
expansion of commercial practices through custom, usage and agreement of the parties.”); § 1-205(2) (“A usage of 
trade is any practice or method of dealing having such regularity of observance in a place, vocation or trade as to 
justify an expectation that it will be observed with respect to the transaction in question.”). 
20   See, e.g., UCC § 1-201(3) (“Agreement” means the bargain of the parties in fact as found in their language or by 
implication from other circumstances including course of dealing or usage of trade…”); § 1-205(3) (“A course of 
dealing between parties and any usage of trade in the vocation or trade in which they are engaged or of which they 
are or should be aware give particular meaning to and supplement or qualify terms of an agreement.”). 
21   See James Whitman, Commercial Law and the American Volk: A Note on Llewellyn’s German Sources for the 
Uniform Commercial Code, 97 YALE L. J. 156, 166-70 (1987); Shael Herman, Llewellyn the Civilian: Speculations 
on the Contribution of Continental Experience to the Uniform Commercial Code, 56 TUL. L. REV. 1125, 1130-31 
(1982). 
22   Whitman, supra note 21, at 165 (quoting and translating LEVIN GOLDSCHMIDT, KRITIK DES ENTWURFS EINES 
HANDELSGESETZBUCHS, 4 KRITISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT F.D. GESAMMTE RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT 113 (1857)) (emphasis 
in original).  Goldschmidt’s influence on Llewellyn’s legal thought is seen in Llewellyn’s approving quotation and 
gloss on Goldschmidt in The Common Law Tradition.  KARL LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 122 
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To Goldschmidt, commercial custom was an outgrowth and manifestation of the collective will of 
the people (Volk).23  The beneficent law-giver was the man who enabled the “immanent,” “natural law,” 
emergent from the will of the Volk and the particular fact-pattern, to be applied.24  The beauty of the “law 
merchant” – lex mercatoria – was its relative independence from rationalistic, Roman-law influenced 
legal systems,25 preeminent cases of which are the Prussian Code (1761) and the French Civil Code 
(1804).  His passionate interest in the law merchant and its relationship to Volk customs, led Goldschmidt 
to dedicate a lifetime of study to “Handelsrecht,” which may be translated as “Commercial Law” or 
“Mercantile Law.”26  By 1891, this lifetime study had culminated in a Universal History of Mercantile 
Law.27  In the language often used to categorize 19th Century German legal scholars, Goldschmidt is 
considered a “Germanist,” albeit one who acknowledged a greater influence by Roman law on local (i.e. 
German) mercantile customs than some of his Germanist counterparts.28  His vision of the law merchant 
as a body of law emergent from mercantile custom remains influential to this day.29
 
 
A.  The Question: The Origin(s) of Modern Commercial Organization Forms,  
and their Connection to Property-Relationship Structures 
 
Viewed in this light, Weber’s decision to write his Dissertation under Goldschmidt takes on 
greater significance, and the substance of that study becomes more comprehensible.  In the introduction to 
The History of Mercantile-Associations, Weber declared his work to be an investigation into medieval 
south-European mercantile customs (Handelsgebrauch, trade usages), based on an examination of 
available original source-materials. 30
                                                                                                                                                                           
(1960).  Channeled through Llewellyn, Goldschmidt’s legacy has survived in U.S. commercial law.  See WHITMAN, 
supra note 21; Arthur L. Corbin, A Tribute to Karl Llewellyn, 71 Yale L.J. 805, at 811-12 (1962).  Somewhat 
ironically, however, Goldschmidt’s survival is at the cost of a mistaken attribution.  See WHITMAN, supra note 21, at 
158 n.16.  Llewellyn mistakenly attributed his quote, not to Goldschmidt’s great life’s-work, the Handbook of 
Commercial Law (see infra note 24) from whence the quote actually comes, but rather to a less famous work.  See id. 
  Specifically, Weber stated that he was interested in whether 
medieval south-European mercantile customs resulted in completely new legal concepts – through general 
acceptance and development into customary law – or whether such customs were met by transformed, but 
23   See id. 
24   See LEVIN GOLDSCHMIDT, HANDBUCH DES HANDELSRECHTS 302 (3d ed. 1875) (1864). 
25   See WHITMAN, supra note 21, at 162-66. 
26   See MARY ELIZABETH BASILE ET AL., LEX MERCATORIA AND LEGAL PLURALISM: A LATE THIRTEENTH-CENTURY 
TREATISE AND ITS AFTERLIFE (Introduction) 163-64 (1998). 
27  See LEVIN GOLDSCHMIDT, UNIVERSALGESCHICHTE DES HANDELSRECHTS (1891); BASILE ET AL, supra note 26, at 
164 n.7. 
28   See WHITMAN, supra note 21, at 159-65 & n.55; WIEACKER, supra note 9, at 300-40, 366-67. 
29   See Stephen E. Sachs, From St. Ives to Cyberspace: The Modern Distortion of the Medieval ‘Law Merchant,’ 21 
AM. U.  INT’L L. REV. 685 (2006); see also supra note 22. 
30   See WEBER, HANDELSGESELLSCHAFTEN, supra note 10, at 312-13. 
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previously existent, legal institutions.31
Consistent with the categories of German commercial law, embodied less than three decades 
previously (1861) in the German Commercial Code,
  In other words, consistent with the interests of his dissertation 
chair (Goldschmidt), Weber had undertaken a study of the relationship among mercantile customs, legal 
concepts and legal institutions in medieval south-Europe, specifically Italy and Spain.  He was 
particularly interested in a subset relationship between custom and law: the organization of persons for 
economic production and commercial activity, and its consequences for property law (Vermögensrecht). 
32 Weber was interested in the origins of two types of 
commercial organization: (1) the Public Mercantile-Association (offene Handelsgesellschaft) and (2) the 
Commenda-Association (Kommanditgesellschaft). 33   Moreover, he was interested in the relationship 
between these types and an ancient Roman type of commercial organization, the societas. 34   In 
distinguishing among these three types of commercial organization, his primary focus was on the 
distinctive property-relationships (Vermögensbeziehungen) – including claims and obligations with 
respect to non-associates, particularly creditors – that were characteristic of these forms.35
Weber’s historical point of departure was the societas of Roman law.
  In fact, as will 
be shown, Weber viewed these distinctive property-relationship structures as constitutive of the particular 
organizational forms. 
36  According to the Roman 
jurists, 37
                                                     
31   See id. at 312. 
 this association was essentially contractual in nature: it created a relationship of reciprocal 
32  See DAS ALLGEMEINE DEUTSCHE HANDELS-GESETZBUCH MIT ERLÄUTERUNGEN NACH DEN MATERIALIEN UND 
BENUTZUNG DER SÄMMTLICHEN VORARBEITEN VON BORNEMANN, BALDECK, STROHN UND BÜRGERS 78-9, 117 
(Berlin 1862) (hereinafter “1861 HGB”). 
33   See WEBER, HANDELSGESELLSCHAFTEN, supra note 10, at 313-44.  To facilitate ready comparison with Anglo-
U.S. legal categories for commercial organization, these are often (and with variations) translated as “General 
Commercial Partnership” and “Limited Partnership,” respectively.  See, e.g. NIGEL FOSTER & SATISH SULE, 
GERMAN LEGAL SYSTEM AND LAWS 492-98 (3d ed. 2002) (1993); GERMAN COMMERCIAL CODE & CODE OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE IN ENGLISH (Charles E. Stewart trans. 2001).  In the context of Weber’s 19th Century historical analysis, 
however, such translations may disguise more than they reveal.  Under contemporary Anglo-American law, 
partnerships are sharply contrasted with corporations, the distinguishing features of the latter being the corporation’s 
separate legal “personality” and shareholders’ limited liability.  See, e.g., JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, 
CORPORATIONS (2d ed. 2003) (1995).  It is generally agreed that the precursor to the modern Anglo-American 
corporation is the joint stock corporation, but the origins of the joint stock corporation have been a matter of debate 
among legal historians.  See M. Schmitthof, The Origin of the Joint-Stock Company, 3 U. TORONTO L.J. 74 (1939).  
Nevertheless, certain historians have taken the position that “public companies” and “commenda” (analogues to 
offene Handelsgesellschaft and Kommanditgesellschaft) were intermediate stages between ancient Roman forms of 
business enterprise and the joint stock corporation, prefiguring in certain respects modern forms of business 
enterprise, including the corporation.  See id, particularly at 79-92.  To use the term “partnership” in translating 
“Gesellschaft” may disguise the fact that Weber was making a similarly broad kind of argument. 
34   See WEBER, HANDELSGESELLSCHAFTEN, supra note 10, at 313-44.  
35   See id. at 314-19, 335-86.   
36   See id. at 313-21. 
37   In the context of a discussion of Roman law, the term “jurist” designates a learned interpreter and expounder of 
the law, whose opinions (responsa) were taken to be authoritative expressions of Roman civil law after the time of 
Caesar Augustus (Octavian).  See THE DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN I.2 (rev’d English ed., Alan Watson ed., 1998) (1985) 
(translation based on the Latin text of Theodor Mommsen, 1868) (Latin text available at The Roman Law Library, 
Page 8 of 54 
obligations (obligationes, from ob + ligare, meaning to tie together, to unite) among the associates, which 
were enforceable between them, but virtually irrelevant as far as third parties were concerned.38  The 
association endured for as long the original associates remained alive and retained a shared understanding, 
but might have a much shorter duration if its purpose was limited or if the associates’ shared 
understanding disappeared.39  For purposes of convenience, the associates might each put money into a 
common fund, creating a kind of “common property” (res (arca) communis). 40
                                                                                                                                                                           
http://webu2.upmf-grenoble.fr/Haiti/Cours/Ak/index.htm
  However, from the 
) (533) (hereinafter “The Digest”); THE INSTITUTES OF 
JUSTINIAN I.2.8 (Peter Birks & Grant McLeod trans. 1987) (including the Latin text of Paul Krüger, 1867, upon 
which the translation is based) (533) (hereinafter “The Institutes of Justinian”); THE INSTITUTES OF GAIUS I.2 (W.M. 
Gordon & O.F. Robinson trans. 1988) (including the revised Latin text of E. Seckel & B. Kübler, 1935 (1903) upon 
which the translation is based) (~160-179) (hereinafter “The Institutes of Gaius”).  See also ANDREW BORKOWSKI, 
TEXTBOOK ON ROMAN LAW 34-8, 43-52 (2d ed. 1997) (1994). 
38   The societas was an Obligation created by shared understanding (consensus, agreement).  See THE INSTITUTES 
OF JUSTINIAN at III.22; THE INSTITUTES OF GAIUS at III.135.  Roman jurists divided Roman law into three 
categories: the law of Persons (Personae), the law of Things (Res), and the law of Actions (Actiones).  See THE 
INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN, supra note 37, at I.2.12; THE INSTITUTES OF GAIUS, supra note 37, at I.8.  The law of 
Actions was roughly analogous to modern procedural law, and concerned the methods for pursuing a claim.  See 
THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN at IV.6.1; THE INSTITUTES OF GAIUS at IV.1-IV.4.  The law of Persons addressed the 
social status of individuals, a primary division being between slaves and free men.  See THE INSTITUTES OF 
JUSTINIAN at I.3; THE INSTITUTES OF GAIUS at I.9.  The law of Things related to corporeal (having a physical body, 
i.e. tangible) and incorporeal (intangible) things, and divided those things into such as were capable of being under 
the proprietary control of a paterfamilias (patrimonium) and such as were beyond such capacity (extra patrimonium).  
See THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN at II.1-II.2; THE INSTITUTES OF GAIUS at II.1-II.14.   
The law of Obligations was a subcategory of the law of Things.  See THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN at II.2; 
THE INSTITUTES OF GAIUS at II.12-II.14.  More specifically, Obligations were viewed as one of several incorporeal 
Things whose essence lay in their constitution by abstract right (ius, including the law/right of all peoples, ius 
gentium) rather than by physical existence.  See id.  Obligations were considered to arise either from delict (i.e. 
wrong to another person, analogous to the “tort” of Anglo-American law) or from contract (i.e. the conclusion of 
business arrangements, contractus).  See THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN at III.13; THE INSTITUTES OF GAIUS at III.88.  
Obligations arising from contract could be created by conduct, by spoken words, by written documents, or by a 
shared understanding (consensus).  See THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN at III.13; THE INSTITUTES OF GAIUS at III.89.  
Actions to enforce Obligations were considered to exist between persons (in personas), rather than pertaining 
directly to a thing, unlike actions relating directly to property (in rem), which included certain incorporeal things 
related to landed property (e.g. rights of way).  See THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN at IV.6.1; THE INSTITUTES OF 
GAIUS at IV.1-IV.4. 
Although it may be obvious from their proximity and similar appearance, it is worth noting that the English 
word “association” is derived from the Latin “societas,” which in turn derives from “socius.”  See THE OXFORD 
DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH ETYMOLOGY 842 (C.T. Onions ed. 1966).  The Latin verb sociare means to unite, to share, 
or to “associate.”  See, e.g., THE NEW COLLEGE LATIN & ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed., John C. Traupman ed., 
1995) (1966).  In the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, the scope of societas expanded from being merely a 
designation of temporally limited associations for specific purposes to a designation of entire human communities.  
See THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH ETYMOLOGY 842 (C.T. Onions ed. 1966).  Thus was born the modern 
English sense of “society.”  See id.  Otto Gierke’s Das deutsche Genossenschaftsrecht provocatively connects these 
cultural developments to the emergence of the modern concept of the “state,” as can be seen from English 
translations provided by Frederick William Maitland and Ernest Barker.  See NATURAL LAW AND THE THEORY OF 
SOCIETY 1500 TO 1800 (Ernest Barker trans. 1950); POLITICAL THEORIES OF THE MIDDLE AGES (Frederick William 
Maitland trans. 1913) (reprints available from The Lawbook Exchange).   
39    See THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN at III.25.4-III.25.5; THE DIGEST, supra note 37, at 17.2.4-17.2.5; THE 
INSTITUTES OF GAIUS at III.151-III.152.  Note that by the Sixth Century, the associates could agree that the 
association would endure beyond their individual lives.  See THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN at III.25.4-III.25.5. 
40   See, e.g., THE DIGEST, supra note 37, at 17.2.14. 
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perspective of third persons, neither the association nor its common fund had any real existence or legal 
significance.  Thus, for example, if in the course of business conducted on behalf of the association, an 
associate entered into an agreement with someone outside the association, but failed to fulfill his 
obligations under the agreement, a legal action would be brought against him individually, not his 
associates or the association as a whole.  If the legal action was successful, the associate might bring an 
action against his other associates to be reimbursed for his expenses.41  Thus, the entire legal significance 
of the societas was in the legal ties formed among the contracting associates, not in the associates’ 
relationships with third parties.42
However, the situation was completely different in the case of Weber’s contemporary Public 
Mercantile-Association (offene Handelsgesellschaft).  In this case the associates might all be sued 
together for action taken by one single associate, or the association itself might be sued under its 
registered trade-name (Firma).
 
43  The associates were solidarily liable for the association’s obligations, 
meaning they were each obligated for the entire amount of any such obligation (regardless of whether 
they themselves were responsible for creating it), and could be forced to pay the entire amount if sued on 
the obligation (e.g. by a creditor).44  This solidary liability was connected with the starkest difference 
between the Public Mercantile-Association and the societas: the former could acquire legal rights – 
including ownership (Eigentum) – and create obligations in its own name, whereas the latter could not.45  
In the case of the Public Mercantile-Association, the “common fund” was the association’s property, 
separate and apart from the associates’ individual contributions, whereas in the case of the societas the 
common fund was simply the aggregated funds of the contributing associates.46
In Weber’s view, the essential differences between the societas of Roman law and the Public 
Mercantile-Association lay in the solidary liability and the association’s separate property, which were 
present in the case of the latter but not in the case of the former.
   
47
                                                     
41   For a concise discussion of the Roman law principles pertaining to societas (translated as “partnership”), see 
BORKOWSKI, supra note 37, at 291-95. 
  These distinctions were based on 
42   For Weber’s thorough discussion of the societates’ legal implications, see WEBER, HANDELSGESELLSCHAFTEN, 
supra note 10, at 314-15.  See also Lutz Kälber’s English translation, supra note 15, at 54. 
43   See 1861 HGB, supra note 32, at II.111-II.112.  For an English translation of the 1900 Commercial Code (which 
is relatively similar in the relevant passages), see THE GERMAN COMMERCIAL CODE (1900) §§ 124, 128 (A.F. 
Schuster trans. 1911) (hereinafter “1900 English HGB”). 
44   See 1861 HGB, supra note 32, at II.112.  See also 1900 English HGB, supra note 43, at § 128 (translating 
“solidarisch” as “jointly and severally”).  The Anglo-American principle of “joint and several liability” is similar.  
For a general discussion of Roman, French and Louisiana solidary liability principles, compared with Anglo-
American joint and several liability, see Harry Cohen, Comment, Solidary Obligations, 25 TUL. L. REV. 217 (1951).  
Under the principle of solidarity, if one associate paid the entire amount of an obligation, he or she could seek 
recompense from the other associates.  See id. at 225-26. 
45   See 1861 HGB, supra note 32, at II.111.  See also 1900 English HGB, supra note 43, at § 124. 
46   For Weber’s much more thorough discussion of these differences, see WEBER, HANDELSGESELLSCHAFTEN, supra 
note 10, at 315-17.  See also Lutz Kälber’s English translation, supra note 15, at 55-6. 
47   WEBER, HANDELSGESELLSCHAFTEN, supra note 10, at 318. 
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differences in (1) the corresponding rights and obligations of associates vis-à-vis one another and third 
parties, and (2) the corresponding rights and obligations of associates and third parties vis-à-vis the 
association’s common property.  Stated even more simply, the essential differences between the societas 
and the Public Mercantile-Association lay in their distinctive property-relations, i.e. the socio-legal ties 
among associates, third parties, and the association’s property.  However, Weber was willing to simplify 
this even further, by defining property itself in socio-relational terms: 
 
Insofar as one now intends to call “property” a complex of rights, which all serve a 
particular purpose, which are uniformly regulated in a particular organized form, and 
upon which rest particular encumbrances – and the authoritativeness of this definition is 
subject to no reasonable doubt – then the entirety of the legal relations previously 
described approaches this character.48
 
 
Thus one may characterize the differences between forms of organization in terms of distinctive property-
relations, which themselves may be viewed as distinctive complexes of rights and obligations among 
associates and third parties, all with reference to a particular object (in this case, the common fund).   
Where there is an object of property, a natural linguistic association – embedded with enormous 
power into Roman law (as well as philosophy) by medieval scholars – causes one to look for a subject.  
To put this in somewhat contemporary 21st Century terms, if there is a thing over which rights can be 
exercised, there must be an entity (a “Subject”) capable of exercising those rights.  In terms of legal 
doctrine, this raises the question of “legal personality,” which is essentially a question of whether the law 
recognizes an entity as capable of bearing rights and obligations.49  As a matter of formal legal doctrine, 
the Public Mercantile-Association of Weber’s day was not considered to be a legal person; this remains 
true today.50  However, Weber was interested in an earlier period, before the joint-stock corporations 
presaging the modern business corporation (today’s proto-typical legal person) had emerged.51
In fact, Weber was interested in the medieval emergence of the idea of “personality,” as applied 
to mercantile associations.
   
52
                                                     
48   Id. at 317. 
  Although the notion of corporate (legal) personality itself was relatively old, 
even under Roman law, it had been most clearly conceived as applying to entities that 21st Century minds 
49   For a thorough discussion of legal personality, its conceptual emergence and its extension to various corporate 
entities (including cities) under Roman law, see P.W. DUFF, PERSONALITY IN ROMAN PRIVATE LAW (Rothman 
Reprints 1971) (1938).  For an excellent discussion of the Anglo-American corporation’s institutional history, 
focused in part on the emergence of legal personality, see Samuel Williston, History of the Law of Business 
Corporations Before 1800, 2 HARV. L. REV. 105, 149 (1888).  
50   See FOSTER & SULE, supra note 33, at 492-93, 495.  Nevertheless, the contemporary law recognizes that the 
association’s ability to acquire property and otherwise do business under its trade-name (Firma) does confer a kind 
of partial legal personality.  See id. 
51   See generally WILLISTON, supra note 49.  See also SCHMITTHOF, supra note 33. 
52   See WEBER, HANDELSGESELLSCHAFTEN, supra note 10, at 317-18. 
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would tend to imbue with a public or semi-public character: cities and towns (civitates, municipia), 
colonies (colonia), priestly bodies (sodalitates), and guild-like craft-worker clubs that provided meals and 
funding for certain needs, particularly funerary needs (collegia).53  Following the rise of Christianity, the 
notion of corporate personality was extended to the Church, as well as to certain other charitable and 
monastic organizations. 54   However, except with respect to associations of tax-collectors (societates 
publicanorum/vectigalium), corporate personality never appears to have been broadly extended to the 
societates by Roman jurists, nor to specifically commercial enterprises, although limited, exceptional 
cases may be ambiguously identifiable.55
In all of the cases where corporate personality was deemed to extend to organizations, the 
endowment of this corporate personality was primarily significant in its implications for property-
relations, for an entity with legal personality was an entity with the capacity to acquire distinct rights and 
obligations vis-à-vis property in its own name.
   
56   For Weber, then, the emergence of mercantile 
associations’ quasi-personality paralleled the emergence of their distinctive property-relations.57  And, 
based on his review of the south-European sources, he believed this emergence began with a simple 
mental and verbal “short-hand” method (eine Art praktischer Breviloquenz) of referring to these 
distinctive property-relations under the trade-name (Firma) of the association. 58   Thus, even if the 
mercantile associations never acquired legal personality as a matter of formal doctrine, they acquired it as 
a matter of customary development, which in turn emerged out of a cultural (ideational and linguistic) 
development.59
 Based on his review of late-Roman (Sixth Century A.D.) legal sources, Weber saw no evidence 
of a shift toward the distinctive property-relations (i.e. solidary liability, separate associational property) 
and corollary quasi-corporate personality that characterized the Public Mercantile-Association of his own 
day.
 
60   Thus, the answer to his initial binary query – whether medieval south-European mercantile 
customs resulted in completely new legal concepts, through general acceptance and development into 
customary law, or whether such customs were met by transformed, but previously existent, legal 
institutions – was negative for the latter, and therefore positive for the former.61
                                                     
53   See generally DUFF, supra note 
   
49. 
54   See id. at 168-203. 
55   See id. at 141-51, 159-61.  As Weber noted, the Roman-law category of societas applied broadly to include 
associations with multiple purposes; associations with commercial purposes were only one large subset of societates.  
See WEBER, HANDELSGESELLSCHAFTEN, supra note 10, at 314.  See also THE DIGEST, supra note 37, at 17.2; 
BORKOWSKI, supra note 37, at 291. 
56   See generally DUFF, supra note 49. 
57   See WEBER, HANDELSGESELLSCHAFTEN, supra note 10, at 317-18. 
58   See id. 
59   See id. 
60   See id. at 319-21. 
61   See supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
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 To put his investigation into contemporary social-scientific terms, Weber was using late-Roman 
legal sources to perform something analogous to a narrowly-specified cultural investigation, attempting to 
locate within legal texts evidence of an ideational shift toward viewing the societates as quasi-corporate 
entities, viewing the common fund as the societas’ separate property, or viewing the associates as 
solidarily liable.62  Seeing no evidence of this ideational shift in the legal texts, Weber concluded that it 
cannot have taken place through gradual modification of established late-Roman legal institutions, but 
must instead have emerged independently out of mercantile custom.63
 Why was Weber able to answer this question so definitely simply from an analysis of (a very 
few) Sixth-Century Byzantine legal sources,
  The remainder of The History of 
Mercantile Associations, including the entirety of the Dissertation, was focused on identifying the precise 
origins and causes of this ideational (i.e. cultural) and customary shift. 
64
 It is generally agreed that, during the period of “Late Antiquity” (depending upon how one 
classifies, roughly the third through seventh centuries A.D.), transformations of broad-ranging social 
significance occurred throughout areas that had been administered under Roman power.
 and then to make what appears to be a radical shift to 
south-European medieval sources?  In order to understand why Weber believed such conclusions were 
defensible it is necessary to briefly examine early-medieval European socio-legal developments. 
65   On the 
European continent, these transformations manifested themselves, among other ways, in altered socio-
legal structures and institutions.  As Germanic “barbarians” exercised increasing administrative power, 
they tended to narrow the application of Roman law to Roman citizens, while permitting native law to be 
applied to Germanic peoples.  These peoples had gained literacy through their encounter with Roman 
culture, but had originally maintained an oral culture; thus their native law was oral and customary, rather 
than written.  In narrowing the application of written Roman law, and in occasionally committing native 
“Germanic” law to writing, the Germanic administrators, whether they intended to or not, brought about 
the demise of Roman law.  Even the Emperor Justinian’s magnificent Roman law codification of the 
Sixth Century (the Code of Justinian),66
                                                     
62   The idea that legal doctrine can be a topic of study for ethnographers, and that legal texts can serve as sources in 
such studies, has been recently defended by anthropologists and science studies scholars.  See Annelise Riles, 
Property as Legal Knowledge: Means and Ends, 10 J. ROY. ANTHROP. INST. 775, 777-78, 791n.2 (2004).  See also 
Mark Suchman, The Contract as Social Artifact, 37 LAW AND SOC’Y REV. 91 (2003). 
 to which Weber refers, had a very minimal European impact at 
63   See WEBER, HANDELSGESELLSCHAFTEN, supra note 10, at 319-21. 
64   All Weber’s sources were from The Digest (Constantinople, 533 A.D.) except for the statute (lex) of the Roman 
(Latin) colony of Malaca, site of present-day Málaga, Spain.  See id. at 320.  See also supra note 37. 
65   This paragraph represents a distillation of what the author believes to be current scholarly consensus.  Exemplary 
sources for the author’s beliefs include RANDALL LESAFFER, EUROPEAN LEGAL HISTORY: A CULTURAL AND 
POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE (2009); PETER STEIN, ROMAN LAW IN EUROPEAN HISTORY (1999); MANLIO BELLOMO, THE 
COMMON LEGAL PAST OF EUROPE (1995); R.C. VAN CAENEGEM, AN HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO PRIVATE LAW 
(1988); WIEACKER, supra note 9.  
66   See THE DIGEST, supra note 37; THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN, supra note 37. 
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the time of its promulgation.  For Europe, the social force of that Code would be held in check for another 
six centuries. 
 Because the period of “Roman law” is viewed by legal scholars as ending gloriously with 
Justinian’s Sixth-Century Code, Weber was able to treat the lack of evidence in that Code as decisive for 
Roman law.  Having failed to find evidence of the ideational shift in perspective (regarding the societates) 
that he was looking for in the Code, he was able to conclude that it never occurred in Roman law.  
Because historically the shift away from written Roman law meant a shift toward unwritten customary 
law – with brief interludes of written law amalgamating Roman and Germanic elements emergent from 
custom – a conclusion that the ideational shift didn’t manifest itself in written Roman law was tantamount 
to a conclusion that it must have occurred through custom.  Weber did not rely on this argument, however.  
Instead, he turned to the available sources in order to find empirical evidence of shifting south-European 
mercantile customs.  These sources were the written south-European laws and mercantile documents 
(primarily contracts, which were typically prepared by trained notaries) of Late Antiquity and the 
subsequent “Middle Ages.” 
 Based on his examination of these materials, Weber concluded that the south-European property-
relations characteristic of the associational “firm” (the analog to the Public Mercantile-Association of his 
day) emerged out of the “household” (Haushalt) and “craft-industry” (Handwerk, Gewerbe) productive 
communities (Gemeinschaften, Genossen), rather than the medieval maritime successors to the Roman 
societates: the commenda, the societates maris, and the societates terrae. 67   Within the ancient 
Mediterranean and Mesopotamian world, the household and the craft-industry “guilds” were 
fundamentally-important socio-economic institutions.68  For Weber, the characteristic property-relations 
of these productive communities were necessarily those which could give rise to the property-relations 
characteristic of the Public Mercantile-Association: associational (i.e. communal, joint) property and 
solidary liability. 69
 
  It was precisely this conclusion that Weber’s Dissertation defended, and that 
constituted the heart of his History of Mercantile-Associations. 
                                                     
67   See WEBER, HANDELSGESELLSCHAFTEN, supra note 10, at 323-86; Kälber’s English translation, supra note 15, at 
63-125.  
68   See A. LEO OPPENHEIM, ANCIENT MESOPOTAMIA 75-83 (rev’d ed. 1977) (1964); ALISON BURFORD, CRAFTSMEN 
IN GREEK AND ROMAN SOCIETY 159-64 (1972); DUFF, supra note 49, at 103 et seq.    Reflecting this potent 
institutional history, it is the Greek word for household (oikos) from whence the English “economics” derives.  See 
THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH ETYMOLOGY 300 (C.T. Onions ed. 1966).  See also Richard Swedberg, The 
Economy as a Material Household: Economic Theorizing From Xenophon to Home Economics and Beyond, in 
TREVOR PINCH & RICHARD SWEDBERG (EDS.) LIVING IN A MATERIAL WORLD: ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY MEETS 
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY STUDIES (2008); M.I. FINLEY, THE ANCIENT ECONOMY (updated ed. 1999) (1973); 
SCOTT MEIKLE, ARISTOTLE’S ECONOMIC THOUGHT (1995). 
69   See WEBER, HANDELSGESELLSCHAFTEN, supra note 10, at 344-86; Kälber’s English translation, supra note 15, at 
85-125. 
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B.  The Answer: Medieval Household and Guild Property-Relational Structures, 
 as Interpreted by Jurists 
 
 In Weber’s view, the physical and legal limitations placed on inheritance by sons of a father’s 
estate, particularly his real property (primarily land and buildings), must necessarily have resulted in some 
form of communal property. 70
 This property-relational structure, with a male head-of-household regarded as the sole “owner” of 
household property, with obligations to administer that property for the benefit of all extended-household 
members, is ancient and archetypal, at least in Indo-European cultures.  It is broadly attested in both 
Greek and Roman law,
  Whenever a male head-of-household (Latin paterfamilias, German 
Familienvater, Hausvater) died leaving more than one male heir, the question to be decided was whether 
the family estate would be divided between the heirs or whether the sons and their families would remain 
together as part of the household without dividing it.  In the case of real property, unless additional land 
was acquired, division over the course of several generations naturally reduced the property to small plots.  
At some point those plots would become too small to sustain even a single family.  Because land was 
expensive and difficult to acquire, and because it was often impossible to expand city property due to 
enclosure by walls, male heirs would often choose to remain, together with their families, as part of the 
father’s household.  Such households, then, might include several generations of male heirs, their wives 
and children, and their domestic servants.  The household property, rather than being divided among the 
males, was controlled by the Hausvater for the benefit of the household.   
71 and its residue remained through Weber’s time into our own.  However, by the 
middle ages certain limits to this absolute father-power were developing: male heirs were empowered 
both to use and to encumber the household property in unlimited amounts.72  On the other hand, any 
property that they acquired became part of the household property.73  Thus, as an internal matter of the 
household, all property was regarded as common, administered primarily by the Hausvater, but to an 
increasing degree by the sons and brothers as well.74
In the eyes of the legal theorists, the household was a productive community in which the results 
of productive labor were shared.
   
75
                                                     
70   See WEBER, HANDELSGESELLSCHAFTEN, supra note 10, at 344-47; Kälber’s English translation, supra note 15, at 
85-8.   
  In a somewhat euphemistic phraseology, from whence we see the 
origins of the Anglo-French “company,” the household members were said to stand as one with respect to 
71   See infra notes 154-158 and accompanying text. 
72   See WEBER, HANDELSGESELLSCHAFTEN, supra note 10, at 345-46; Kälber’s English translation, supra note 15, at 
86-7. 
73   See id. 
74   See WEBER, HANDELSGESELLSCHAFTEN, supra note 10, at 345-49; Kälber’s English translation, supra note 15, at 
86-9. 
75   See WEBER, HANDELSGESELLSCHAFTEN, supra note 10, at 347-49; Kälber’s English translation, supra note 15, at 
88-9. 
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the bread and wine (stare ad unum panem et vinum).76  This cultural and juristic perspective was not 
limited to the household, however, but also extended to the craft-industry guilds, which produced the 
goods that enriched so many medieval cities. 77  The common perspective was possible because the 
medieval jurists didn’t view actual kinship as an essential element in constituting a household 
community; in fact, as has already been mentioned, such households included many non-kin, such as 
wives and servants.78  Thus, because the property-relations among craft-workers were essentially the 
same as those of members within a household, the jurists regarded them as constituting the same basic 
type of productive community.79
 With respect to property-relations within these productive communities, the essential change 
occurred when individual members came to be regarded as having an individual “share” in the common 
property.
 
80  This occurred for households because of a few limited cases in which family members, 
including daughters, were viewed as having property that either never became part of the household, or as 
individually due a portion of the household’s property.81  Although these were very limited exceptions to 
the basic principle of common property, their existence necessitated an accounting for the household 
property in terms of individual accounts or “shares.”82  As soon as individual accounts were created for 
the household’s property, Weber argued, the tendency to view acquired property and debts as individual 
rather than communal became much greater.83  The extent to which this tendency was followed differed 
between northern and southern Italy, according to Weber, and it was the limitation of this tendency, the 
maintenance of strong communal property principles, that facilitated the development of the “firm” in the 
Lombard north. 84
 The other essential element of the Public Mercantile-Association, solidary liability, also emerged 
out of the household, according to Weber, as a result of its primordial links to kinship liability.
  This limitation was necessary in order to enable the concept of “associational 
property,” which was one essential element of the Public Mercantile-Association. 
85
                                                     
76   See id. 
  Such 
kinship liability systems have recurrently formed the precursors to formal legal systems, and stories of 
their brutality are used by legal theorists to evidence the need for established legal systems.  Over time, 
77   See WEBER, HANDELSGESELLSCHAFTEN, supra note 10, at 351-52; Kälber’s English translation, supra note 15 at 
91-93. 
78   See id. 
79   See id. 
80   See WEBER, HANDELSGESELLSCHAFTEN, supra note 10, at 346-51; Kälber’s English translation, supra note 15, at 
87-91. 
81   See id. 
82   See id. 
83   See id. 
84   See id. 
85   See WEBER, HANDELSGESELLSCHAFTEN, supra note 10, at 356-57; Kälber’s English translation, supra note 15, at 
96-7. 
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limitations on this collective responsibility for wrongs (delicts) committed by family-members came to be 
imposed, but with the growth of household commercial activity the concept was nevertheless extended to 
include an analogous situation: the collective responsibility to pay a creditor harmed by a debtor’s 
inability to pay his debt.86  Thus, although the legal system eliminated many aspects of familial “joint 
liability” in the interests of public stability, the residue that remained became particularized to 
commercial matters, forming the core of a productive community’s “solidary liability.”87
 The power of this solidary liability lay in its ability to meld a productive community of property 
into a personal community: to satisfy an associate’s unpaid debt, a creditor could either take action 
against the associational property (an in rem proceeding) or he could take action against the associates 
personally, demanding that they satisfy the obligation from whatever property they might happen to 
possess, some of which might be deemed separate and apart from the association’s common property (an 
in personam proceeding).
 
88  This enabled associations to operate on the basis of increasing amounts of 
debt, and thereby permitted the scale of household and guild commerce to increase dramatically, since 
creditors were given greater security for their loans, in the form of personal guarantees on top of the 
common associational property that could be seized.89
 On the other hand, as the commercial scale of business activity expanded, and as workshops and 
factories became increasingly separated from domestic household activities, such unlimited solidary 
liability was increasingly perceived as unjust in cases where the liability arose out of activities unrelated 
to the common commercial purposes.
   
90  So over time the city statutes regulating household and guild 
activities tended to limit solidary liability to obligations undertaken in relation to those common business 
purposes.91  In order to clearly differentiate obligations undertaken on behalf of the business from those 
undertaken for other, more personal purposes, associates entered into obligations under the trade-name of 
the commercial enterprise, the Firma. 92  Hence arose that “short-hand” method (die Art praktischer 
Breviloquenz) of referring to the association’s property-relations under the name of the “firm,” which 
Weber viewed as the customary origin of corporate personality.93
                                                     
86   See id. 
 
87   See WEBER, HANDELSGESELLSCHAFTEN, supra note 10, at 356-74; Kälber’s English translation, supra note 15, at 
96-113. 
88   See WEBER, HANDELSGESELLSCHAFTEN, supra note 10, at 357-74; Kälber’s English translation, supra note 15, at 
98-113. 
89   See id. 
90   See WEBER, HANDELSGESELLSCHAFTEN, supra note 10, at 373-81; Kälber’s English translation, supra note 15, at 
113-21. 
91   See id. 
92   See WEBER, HANDELSGESELLSCHAFTEN, supra note 10, at 381-83; Kälber’s English translation, supra note 15, at 
121-23. 
93   See id.; see also supra note 58 and accompanying text.  Striking manifestations of this “short-hand” method, as 
picked up by U.S. jurists, can be seen in several early Pennsylvania decisions compiled, together with the first 
Page 17 of 54 
 In Weber’s view, these south-European medieval processes resulted in the creation of two 
associational “types,” characterized by their distinctive property-relations. 94   The first, which 
corresponded to the Commenda-association of his day, emerged directly out of the Roman societas and 
manifested itself in the medieval south-European commenda, societates maris, and societates terrae.95
 Extrapolating slightly, it would seem that the development of this second type was more 
interesting to Weber because its development was more complex and had greater significance for modern 
capitalism, being in many ways the precursor to the modern business corporation.  What emerges most 
clearly from Weber’s text, however, is his deep interest in the complex interaction among (1) mercantile 
custom and material reality, (2) legal practice and regulation, and (3) juristic philosophy 
(jurisprudence).
  
The second, in which he was primarily interested, corresponded to the Public Mercantile-Association of 
his day.   
96
In Weber’s view, the complexity of interaction between commercial law and economic reality 
was demonstrated by the fact that the Public Mercantile-Association did not develop out of the entities 
that first continued the provision of commercial goods and services following the demise of the Western 
Roman Empire: the medieval societates and commenda.  Rather, the Public Mercantile-Association’s 
defining property-relations developed from areas of the economy that were seemingly quite distant from 
mercantile exchange: the household community and craft-industry guild.  As these productive 
communities increasingly engaged in large-scale commercial activity and mercantile exchange, the 
medieval jurists trained in Roman law struggled to incorporate them into a system that formally had no 
place for them.  In the end, they placed their reliance on the very thing that the associational members 
relied on to delineate their solidary personal liability: operation under the “firm’s” trade name.
  The picture that Weber paints is one in which these three forces operated together, to a 
certain extent according to their own independent logics but also in constant interactional tension, shaping 
certain ideational and cultural developments that were critical to the emergence of the modern business 
organization, or “firm.”   
97
                                                                                                                                                                           
United States Supreme Court opinions, by A.J. Dallas.  See, e.g., Tillier v. Whitehead, 1 U.S. (Dallas) 269 (Penn. 
1788); Musgrove v. Gibbs, 1 U.S. (Dallas) 216 (Penn. 1787). 
  In such 
cases the jurists were able to analogize the commercial associations to the (non-mercantile) corporations 
known to Roman law, and to determine the implications of their activities according to established 
94   See WEBER, HANDELSGESELLSCHAFTEN, supra note 10, at 427; Kälber’s English translation, supra note 15, at 
169. 
95   See WEBER, HANDELSGESELLSCHAFTEN, supra note 10, at 323-44, 386-428; Kälber’s English translation, supra 
note 15, at 63-83, 127-71. 
96   See especially WEBER, HANDELSGESELLSCHAFTEN, supra note 10, at 321-22, 383-86, 427-40; Kälber’s English 
translation, supra note 15 at 60-61, 123-25, 169-81. 
97   See WEBER, HANDELSGESELLSCHAFTEN, supra note 10, at 427-40; Kälber’s English translation, supra note 15, at 
169-80. 
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jurisprudential principles.  By bringing corporate personality and its characteristic property-relations 
together with mercantile and commercial activity, the medieval jurists laid the jurisprudential foundations 
necessary to legally conceptualize commercial corporations, which would become so vital to modern 
capitalism. 
 
C.  Significance of Weber’s Dissertation for a Sociological Theory of Property 
  
In investigating the origins of modern, commercial associational forms (Gesellschaften), and in 
attributing those origins to medieval communal forms (Gemeinschaften), Weber articulated his own 
version of the transition from community to contractual association that became archetypal for early 
sociology through the work of Ferdinand Tönnies, 98 and that continues to resonate in contemporary 
sociology.99
With respect to the subject of property, Weber’s Dissertation is significant for a number of 
reasons.  To begin with, it is striking that Weber’s first published definition of property was stated in 
terms that so strongly echo the “bundle of rights” definitions in vogue today.
  That he did so by means of a sophisticated legal and cultural analysis, investigating an 
original hypothesis concerning precursors to modern capitalism’s preeminent corporate organizational 
form, testifies to Weber’s scholarly personality.   
100  Such definitions, as can 
be clearly seen in the contemporary work of the economist Yoram Barzel, often point to a relationship of 
dependency between property “rights” and the organizational structure of social relationships.101  This 
was certainly true for Weber’s treatment, which was historically and legally sophisticated in its analysis 
of the interdependence between property and organized social relationships.  This theme was one to 
which Weber would repeatedly return, and it formed part of his continued project to explore the role of 
law in economy and society.102
Furthermore, Weber’s utilization of primary legal texts in an effort to identify the source(s) of an 
“ideational” (cultural) shift toward viewing the firm as a separate legal entity with property-related rights 
 
                                                     
98    COMMUNITY AND CIVIL SOCIETY (2001, Jose Harris ed.) (first published in 1887 as Gemeinschaft und 
Gesellschaft). 
99   See, e.g., Bruce Keith & Morton G. Ender, The Sociological Core: Conceptual Patterns and Idiosyncrasies in 
the Structure and Content of Introductory Sociology Textbooks, 1940-2000, 32 TEACHING SOCIOLOGY 19, 27 
(2004); Steven Brint, Gemeinschaft Revisited: A Critique and Reconstruction of the Community Concept, 19 
SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 1 (2001); Michael Hechter and Satoshi Kanazawa, Sociological Rational Choice Theory, 23 
ANNUAL REV. SOC. 191, 196 (1997).  As these journals and titles partially indicate, references to these concepts 
cross a wide spectrum in sociology, from rational choice theory to sociology of religion and communications 
research in the tradition of Robert K. Merton and Paul Lazarsfeld. 
100   See supra note 48 and accompanying text.  For a contemporary statement of the “bundle of rights” definition, 
see e.g., GRANT S. NELSON ET AL., CONTEMPORARY PROPERTY 5 (2d ed. 2002). 
101   See generally BARZEL, supra note 2. 
102   See infra, particularly Section IV. 
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and obligations is methodologically interesting, resonating with emerging themes in socio-legal and 
cultural studies.103  In using primary legal texts to identify the sources of cultural change, and in briefly 
exploring the role of classically-trained “jurists” in formulating (through analogy to classical Roman law 
forms) a legal doctrine for application to emerging corporate entities, Weber indicated a process 
according to which legal concepts can play a causal role in social and cultural change.  This early 
formulation would receive much deeper treatment in Weber’s “sociology of law.”104
 
 
III.  The Economic-historical Phase: 
A Great Transformation from Agrarian to Commercial Property-Relations 
 
 
A.  Agrarian Property-Relations in Antiquity: The Habilitation 
 
 
 Building to a certain extent off his Dissertation, Weber’s Habilitation established a trajectory for 
his future career and a large portion of his substantive scholarly work through its focus on agrarian 
property-relations, particularly ownership (Eigentum) and possession (Besitz) of land.  This second 
dissertation, published in Fall 1891, was titled “Roman Agrarian History in its Significance for Public and 
Private Law”.105  It was dedicated to the “Herr Privy-Counselor” August Meitzen,106 a statesman whose 
scholarly contributions to statistical “state-science” (Staatswissenschaft) and agrarian history had earned 
him an “extraordinary” appointment to University of Berlin’s Faculty of Philosophy.107  Although Roman 
public/administrative and private law figured prominently as source-material for the Habilitation, Weber 
directed primary focus on the writings of the Roman land-surveyors (agrimensores),108
                                                     
103   See RILES, supra note 62; SUCHMAN, supra note 62; see also ANNE NORTON, REPUBLIC OF SIGNS 123-38 (1993). 
 which in 1848-
104   See infra note 304 and accompanying text. 
105    See MAX WEBER, DIE RÖMISCHE AGRARGESCHICHTE IN IHRER BEDEUTUNG FÜR DAS STAATS- UND 
PRIVATRECHT (1891), as republished in MAX WEBER GESAMTAUSGABE I/2 (Jürgen Deininger ed. 1986) (hereinafter 
“Die Römische Agrargeschichte”).  This work was only recently translated into English by Richard I. Frank.  See 
ROMAN AGRARIAN HISTORY IN ITS RELATION TO ROMAN PUBLIC AND CIVIL LAW (Richard I. Frank trans. 2008). 
106   See WEBER, DIE RÖMISCHE AGRARGESCHICHTE, supra note 105, at 92.  See also supra note 13 and infra note 
107. 
107   University of Berlin had been instituted upon the explicitly-formulated ideology that every individual discipline, 
all specialized knowledge, must be connected to the foundational discipline: philosophy, the “general knowledge.”  
See WIEACKER, supra note 9, at 279 n.2, 293.  This ideology manifested itself alongside emergent German 
nationalism in the organizational structure of the University, which divided the faculty into four basic categories: 
law, medicine, theology and philosophy.  See Leo S. Rowe, Instruction in Public Law and Political Economy in 
German Universities, 1 ANN. AMERICAN ACAD. OF POL. & SOC. SCI. 78, 79 (1890).  All specialized knowledge not 
falling within the categories of law, medicine or theology was classified as “philosophy,” including economics and 
statistics.  See id.  Because his scholarly and professional work pertained to statistical science and “national-
economy” (National-Ökonomie), Meitzen was classified as a professor within the Faculty of Philosophy.  See id. at 
84.  As an “extraordinary” professor, he was not allowed to vote alongside his “ordinary” colleagues and probably 
received a lower salary.  See id. at 79.   
108    See WEBER, DIE RÖMISCHE AGRARGESCHICHTE, supra note 105, at 105-6.  See also Jürgen Deininger, 
Editorischer Bericht, in WEBER, DIE RÖMISCHE AGRARGESCHICHTE, supra note 105, at 81-2. 
Page 20 of 54 
1852 had been edited and published by Karl Lachmann, Friedrich Blüme and A. Rudorff as Die Schriften 
der römischen Feldmesser. 109   While on the one hand the Habilitation served alongside Weber’s 
Dissertation to qualify him as a jurisprudential lecturer in “Commercial and Roman (Public and Private) 
Law,”110 it also marked a shift in Weber’s academic scholarship toward a focus on economics and public 
administration, which would be manifested in his professional appointments as well as numerous 
scholarly works.111
 The Habilitation started from a simple but fundamental question: what caused Rome to be 
transformed from a Mediterranean-based city-state, analogous in many respects to contemporaneous 
Greek poleis and Phoenician city-states, into a continental empire built on territorial conquest?
 
112  Starting 
from a position close to that of “methodological individualism,”113 Weber posited the further question: 
was this transitional-development an intended (bewußt) outcome, achieved as a result of the power and 
ambition of particular social strata and economic interest-groups?114  If the intentional wielding of socio-
economic power did lie at the heart of Rome’s transformation, what was the object toward which this 
socio-economic power was directed, or in slightly different words, what objective motivated the wielding 
of this socio-economic power?  Weber’s answer to this question was as follows: the ultimate object over 
which social conflict took place (das eigentliche Kampfobject) was that which was the “prize of (military) 
victory” (der Preis des Siegers): the land of the Roman people, the “public land” (ager publicus).115
 The distinction between public and private things (res publicae, res privatae) – along with a 
complementary third category, that of sacred things (res sacrorum) – appears to have been fundamental in 
 
                                                     
109   See BRIAN CAMPBELL, THE WRITINGS OF THE ROMAN LAND SURVEYORS: INTRODUCTION, TEXT, TRANSLATION 
AND COMMENTARY xii, xxii (Journal of Roman Studies Monograph No. 9) (2000).  Weber also relied extensively on 
the aristocratic Roman agrarian authors, particularly Cato, Varro and Columella, as well as Cicero and other primary 
Roman sources.  See generally WEBER, DIE RÖMISCHE AGRARGESCHICHTE, supra note 105, and particularly the 
Quellenregister and Personenregister, at 400-18. 
110   See Jürgen Deininger, Editorischer Bericht, in WEBER, DIE RÖMISCHE AGRARGESCHICHTE, supra note 105, at 
64-7; Käsler, supra note 14, at 7-8.  Weber is often described (including by his wife Marianne) as qualifying in both 
Roman and German law (in addition to commercial law) but this is incorrect – formally, he was never “habilitated” 
in German law.  See Jürgen Deininger, Editorischer Bericht, in WEBER, DIE RÖMISCHE AGRARGESCHICHTE, supra 
note 105, at 65n.5; cf. MARIANNE WEBER, MAX WEBER: A BIOGRAPHY 115 (Harry Zohn trans. & ed., Transaction 
Publishers ed. 1988) (1975). 
111   See generally Käsler, supra note 14. 
112  See WEBER, DIE RÖMISCHE AGRARGESCHICHTE, supra note 105, at 101-2.  See also MAX WEBER, 
AGRARVERHÄLTNISSE IM ALTERTUM, originally published in Handwörterbuch der Staatswissenschaften (1909), and 
republished by Marianne Weber in MAX WEBER, GESAMMELTE AUFSÄTZE ZUR SOZIAL-UND-
WIRTSCHAFTSGESCHICHTE 190-91, 218-19 (1924) (hereinafter “AGRARVERHÄLTNISSE”); for an English translation, 
see THE AGRARIAN SOCIOLOGY OF ANCIENT CIVILIZATIONS (R. I. Frank trans., Verso edition, 1988 (NLB edition 
1976)). 
113   Weber explicitly embraced a position of methodological individualism (i.e. the methodological position that the 
basic unit of sociological explanation must be the individual person, rather than collective social entities, e.g. nation-
states) in Economy and Society.  See WEBER, supra note 8, at 13-19; see also SWEDBERG, supra note 8, at 23, 163-64 
(1998). 
114   See WEBER, DIE RÖMISCHE AGRARGESCHICHTE, supra note 105, at 101-2. 
115   See id. at 102. 
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its cultural significance to the Roman people, and particularly to Roman lawyers.116  Evidence for the 
distinction appears in the oldest written Roman laws, The Twelve Tables,117 which were drafted circa 451-
450 B.C.118
 
  Over the course of the Republican period (c. 510-27 B.C.) the distinction was formalized, so 
that by the time of Gaius’ Institutes (c. 160-79 A.D.) it was possible for a Roman jurist to state 
definitively that: 
things which are under human law [i.e. not governed by divine law] are either public or 
private.  Public things are regarded as no one’s property, for they are thought of as 




This distinction was applied to all things, across the categorical division between things with a physical 
embodiment (res corporales) – things capable of being touched – and things without a physical 
embodiment (res incorporales), which cannot be touched.120
 The corporeal (tangible) thing that was arguably preeminent in both cultural and economic 
significance to the Romans, as well as so many of their Mediterranean contemporaries, was land (ager).
 
121  
In the agriculturally-based communities of the ancient Mediterranean world, possession of land was vital 
to basic survival.122  Moreover, wealth tended to be conceptualized in terms of land and agricultural 
improvements, particularly horses and cattle.123
                                                     
116   Note that the word “republic” derives from res publica, the public thing (or property).  See CICERO, THE 
REPUBLIC I.XXV.  The English word “commonwealth” captures this conception very nicely. 
  In order to obtain loans for acquisition of land and its 
117   See Table VII, as compiled, translated and published in ROMAN CIVILIZATION: SELECTED READINGS, THE 
REPUBLIC AND THE AUGUSTAN AGE 112 (Vol. I) (Naphtali Lewis & Meyer Reinhold eds., 3d ed., 1990) (hereinafter 
“ROMAN CIVILIZATION: SELECTED READINGS”).  For a Latin text, see Fontes Iuris Romani Antiqui I (Georg Bruns & 
Otto Gradenwitz eds. 1909), available at http://www.fh-augsburg.de/~harsch/a_chron.html.  See also THE DIGEST, 
supra note 37, at 43.8.5. 
118   See BORKOWSKI, supra note 37, at 28-30.  As late as the time of Cicero, Roman boys were required to 
memorize the Twelve Tables.  See CICERO, THE LAWS II.xxiii.59. 
119   THE INSTITUTES OF GAIUS, supra note 37, at II.10-11; see also THE DIGEST, supra note 37, at 1.8; 43.1.1 
(Ulpian).   
120   See THE INSTITUTES OF GAIUS, supra note 37, at II.12-14.  In contemporary Anglo-American property law, a 
parallel distinction is drawn between “tangible” and “intangible” things.  See, e.g., NELSON ET AL., supra note 100, 
at 5. 
121   See J.A. CROOK, LAW AND LIFE OF ROME 147 (Cornell Paperbacks ed. 1984) (1967); STUDIES IN ROMAN 
PROPERTY (M.I. Finley ed. 1976); M. ROSTOVTZEFF, THE SOCIAL & ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 1-
21 (1926). 
122   See MARY T. BOATWRIGHT ET AL., THE ROMANS FROM VILLAGE TO EMPIRE 23-5 (2004); SARAH POMEROY ET 
AL., ANCIENT GREECE: A POLITICAL, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL HISTORY 1-9, 283-85 (1999).   
123   See e.g. CICERO, THE REPUBLIC II.IX; THE POLITEIA (CONSTITUTION) OF ATHENS 3.  It is generally accepted 
that the English word “capital” is derived from the Latin noun caput (“head”) and its related root capit-.  See THE 
OXFORD DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH ETYMOLOGY 143 (C.T. Onions, ed. 1966).  See also WILL DURANT, OUR 
ORIENTAL HERITAGE 16 (The Easton Press 1992) (1935). (“The Romans used kindred words – pecus and pecunia – 
for cattle and money, and placed an image of an ox upon their early coins.  Our own words capital, chattel and cattle 
go back through the French to the Latin capitale, meaning property: and this in turn derives from caput, meaning 
head – i.e., of cattle.”) 
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continued improvement, the poorest members of ancient society were often forced to offer their own 
bodies to secure the loans, with the result that debt-slavery was common.124  As a result, the archetypal 
lawgiver, in the Greek and Roman conception at least, was the man who could resolve repeated and bitter 
conflicts over the distribution of land through allotment procedures.125
 According to Cicero, expansion of Roman land through a combination of treaties and military 
conquests began at Rome’s inception, initiated by the legendary founder Romulus sometime in the 8th 
Century B.C.
 
126  Cicero attributed to Romulus’ successor, Numa Pompilus (late 8th to early 7th Century 
B.C.), the first division and allocation among Roman citizens of land acquired in this manner. 127  
Although this record is the stuff of legend rather than historical fact, having been articulated long 
afterward by Roman authors,128 it provides tantalizing hints at the origin of a practice that seems to have 
been formalized as early as the 4th Century B.C.: treating land acquired through military expansion as 
“public land” (ager publicus), that is, as land belonging to the populus Romanus collectively as a 
universitas.129
 Colonist-farmers (coloni) were sent out to settle on the land in colonies (colonia), having been 
granted legally-protected possession by the populus Romanus, which during the republican period was 
embodied in the Senate.
   
130  In certain limited cases, the conquered land might pass into private ownership 
(dominium), either because it was purchased from the populus Romanus by an individual, or because it 
was allocated directly to an individual, a process sometimes referred to as “viritane assignment”. 131
                                                     
124   See THE POLITEIA (CONSTITUTION) OF ATHENS 2 (describing the unhappy situation of impoverished Athenians 
prior to the time of Draco and Solon).  For an image of the ancient Roman situation, see THE TWELVE TABLES, 
TABLE III (describing the procedures for dealing with debts owed, which included sale into slavery across the Tiber 
River and an optional “cutting into parts” by the creditors, which may refer either to the debtor’s body or his 
possessions). 
  
However, the vast majority of land acquired by conquest was regarded as belonging to the populus 
125    See THE POLITEIA (CONSTITUTION) OF ATHENS (describing Solon’s lawgiving efforts in establishing the 
“constitution” of Athens); CICERO, THE REPUBLIC II.XIV (describing Numa’s division of the land won by Romulus 
in conquest); PLUTARCH, PARALLEL LIVES (Lycurgus, lawgiver of Sparta and Numa Pompilus, lawgiver of Rome).  
See also PLATO, THE LAWS BOOK V; GLENN R. MORROW, PLATO’S CRETAN CITY 95-152 (1993 Edition) (1960) 
(placing Plato’s elaborate land-allotment scheme in The Laws in historical and cultural context). 
126   THE REPUBLIC II.II – II.XIV.  The dating of Romulus’ life to the 8th Century B.C. (753-715) is attributable to 
Marcus Terentius Varro (116-27 B.C.).  See BOATWRIGHT ET AL, supra note 122, at 37-40. 
127   THE REPUBLIC II.XIV.  For Varro’s dates, see BOATWRIGHT ET AL, supra note 122, at 37-40. 
128   See BOATWRIGHT ET AL, supra note 122, at 37-40. 
129   See id. at 81-2; ROSTOVTZEFF, supra note 121, at 14-16; SMITH, supra note 119, at 38-9.  See also APPIAN, THE 
CIVIL WARS I.7 (Horace White ed.). 
130   See APPIAN, THE CIVIL WARS I.7 (Horace White ed.); BOATWRIGHT ET Al, supra note 122, at 81-82; SMITH, 
supra note 119, at 38-9, 315-20. 
131   See Siculus Flaccus, Categories of Land in CAMPBELL, supra note 109 at 120, 127-28; LIVY, HISTORY OF ROME 
31.4; POLYBIUS, THE RISE OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 2.21 (Ian Scott-Kilvert trans., Penguin edition 1979).  See also 
BOATWRIGHT ET AL, supra note 122, at 81; SMITH, supra note 119, at 38-9; P.L. MacKendrick, Roman Colonization, 
6 PHOENIX 139 (1952).  In addition, beginning with Octavian, Caesar Augustus (c. 27 B.C.) and extending 
throughout the remainder of the Empire, portions of conquered land were considered to pass directly into the private 
ownership (dominium) of the emperor.  See SMITH, supra note 119, at 38-9. 
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Romanus: “viritane assignments” were politically controversial, and the establishment of individual 
ownership through purchase apparently occurred infrequently.132
 Thus the situation that developed over the course of the Roman Republican period with respect to 
landed property appears to have been generally as follows.  Outright ownership of land by private 
individuals had existed at least from the time of the Twelve Tables (c 450 B.C.), but it was rare, being 
limited primarily to ancient wealthy families (the senatorial classes, which at first only included the 
patricians and later expanded to include the equites) and the immediate territory around Rome, with very 
limited patchwork additions across the wider Italian peninsula.  The vast majority of the land acquired in 
the course of Rome’s military expansion across the Italian peninsula, North Africa, Spain and southern 
Europe was regarded as ager publicus, “owned” by the populus Romanus, but legally under the 
possession of public corporate bodies (municipia, colonia, praefecturae) as well as private individuals. 
 
 In general, legally-protected possession of the ager publicus implied the legally-sanctioned ability 
to make use of the land and profit from its fruits (usus and fructus, often referred to together as 
usufruct).133  It was therefore possible to profit extensively from the ager publicus without having legal 
ownership.  The skilled professionals who enabled this complex system to develop through their detailed 
surveys of the land (establishing boundaries and separating public from private land), their records of 
land-assignments, and their assistance in resolving disputes relating to ownership, possession, and tax-
obligations pertaining to the land, were the agrimensores.134
 With this background, Weber’s inquiry in the Roman Agrarian History comes into greater focus, 
and his source-materials take on added significance.   
   
 In his introduction, Weber emphasized the “sharp contrast” between a situation in which persons 
living on and/or making use of land are merely granted a kind of “precarious” possession of public land, 
and the alternative situation “bearing the stamp of consciousness and modernity on its forehead”: the 
private, individual ownership of land and soil (Grund und Boden), which is consequentially attended by 
the “individualistic motivations” of free disposition of title by proprietors, at increasing levels of velocity, 
or mobility (Beweglichkeit).135
                                                     
132   See Siculus Flaccus, Categories of Land in CAMPBELL, supra note 109 at 119-20; POLYBIUS, THE RISE OF THE 
ROMAN EMPIRE 2.21 (Ian Scott-Kilvert trans., Penguin edition 1979) (indicating the controversial nature of “viritane 
assignment” by labeling it a “demogogic measure”); SMITH, supra note 119, at 38-9; MACKENDRICK, supra note 
131, at 145-46. 
   
133   See THE INSTITUTES OF GAIUS, supra note 37, at II.7.  Gaius refers only to land in the provinces, and thus 
excludes the Italian peninsula.  The reason for this is simple: in 111 B.C. a controversial agrarian law had 
transformed the Italian ager publicus into property under the private ownership of the individuals or corporate 
bodies who had previously possessed it.  See ROMAN CIVILIZATION: SELECTED READINGS, supra note 117, at 276-83.  
See also WEBER, DIE RÖMISCHE AGRARGESCHICHTE, supra note 105, at 102-103. 
134   See CAMPBELL, supra note 109, at xxvii-lxi; SMITH, supra note 119, at 37-44. 
135   See WEBER, DIE RÖMISCHE AGRARGESCHICHTE, supra note 105, at 102. 
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 In striking similarity to his Dissertation, Weber was interested in identifying the source of an 
ideational shift toward a particular property-related conception, in this case the “ownership-concept” 
(Eigentumsbegriff).136  Moreover, also in striking similarity to his Dissertation, Weber was interested in 
locating the economic ideas (wirtschaftliche Gedanken) emergent from Roman agrarian practice, which 
corresponded to this essentially juristic concept of “ownership” (Eigentum).137
One of Weber’s central arguments in his Habilitation was that the legal changes corresponding to 
the economic changes he would investigate – the shift toward a conception of land analogous to the 
private-ownership-concept and the growth of an economic industry centered around the profit-oriented 
exchange of property-titles (i.e. capitalistic exchange) – were not to be sought for primarily in Roman 
private law and freedom of contract, but rather were located in Roman public and administrative law.
  In seeking to understand 
the historical processes according to which conceptions from a particular area of the economy were 
brought together with concepts from legal practice and theory, Weber was again seeking to understand the 
complex interaction between law and the economy, to which he would return so often in his later work.   
138  
The chronological location of these developments, Weber argued, could be delineated by beginning with 
the Agrarian Law of 111 B.C., - which followed a period of intense conflict over land-allocations and 
transformed vast expanses of the ager publicus into privately owned land – and focusing particularly on 
the Roman Republic’s final century, then following the course of developments through to the Imperial 
age. 139   From the soil of that Imperial age would emerge the “manorial dominion system” 
(Grundherrschaft) of the early middle ages.140
 Weber began his Habilitation by examining in extensive detail the various forms of land-
measurement utilized by the Roman land-surveyors.
 
141
                                                     
136   See id. 
  By combining these sources with earlier Roman 
writings and legal sources, Weber sought to sketch out an historical account of the development of the 
137   See id.  In posing this question about the “ownership-concept” and noting its dominance of juristic thought, 
Weber also paused to recognize the fact that some “admire” its consequences, while others regard it as “the root of 
all evil in our real property law.”  See id.   
138   See id. at 102-4.  In this thesis, the influence of Theodor Mommsen and August Meitzen is particularly evident.  
Theodor Mommsen had written and lectured extensively on Roman public and administrative law, and August 
Meitzen’s entire career had been devoted to public administration.  See Jürgen Deininger, Einleitung, in WEBER, DIE 
RÖMISCHE AGRARGESCHICHTE, supra note 105, at 15-19, 22-4. 
139   WEBER, DIE RÖMISCHE AGRARGESCHICHTE, supra note 105, at 102-4.  On the Agrarian Law of 111 B.C., see 
supra note 133. 
140   See WEBER, DIE RÖMISCHE AGRARGESCHICHTE, supra note 105, at 104, 297-352.  For Weber’s final description 
of this transition, as transcribed through the notes of his students in a course entitled “Outlines of Universal Social 
and Economic History,” delivered in winter semester 1919-20 (i.e. right before his death), see MAX WEBER, 
GENERAL ECONOMIC HISTORY 51-73 (Frank Knight trans., Dover ed. 2003) (original English publication 1927) 
(1923). 
141   WEBER, DIE RÖMISCHE AGRARGESCHICHTE, supra note 105, at 107-40.  For the Roman land-surveyors’ 
description, see generally CAMPBELL, supra note 109. 
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measurement-forms described by the land-surveyors.142  Such a task presented significant challenges, in 
particular because the Roman land-surveyors’ writings date from a much later period, i.e. the 2d century 
A.D. through the 5th and 6th centuries A.D.143  Weber’s primary objective, however, was to establish a 
relationship between these measurement-forms and Roman public law, particularly tax-administration.144  
In taking the position that the methods and forms of Roman land-surveying and allotment resulted from 
the particular characteristics of Roman public administration, Weber explicitly argued against an 
alternative perspective, which was that these forms and methods originated from particular ethnic or 
cultural characteristics of the Roman people and their neighbors.145
 The bulk of Weber’s Habilitation was devoted to an examination of the status of various types of 
land under Roman public and private law.
 
146   The complexity of the underlying materials and the 
technicality of Weber’s arguments render a detailed treatment beyond the scope of this article.  Moreover, 
certain of the arguments relied on categorizations of land developed by August Meitzen in the course of 
his research, which Weber later viewed as being somewhat inappropriate for application to ancient 
Rome.147
 The basic course of development can be summarized as follows: through a combination of (1) 
detailed delineation of land-boundaries by the land-surveyors, (2) the Agrarian Laws, (3) the operation of 
occupatio under Roman private law (which transformed public land into privately owned land through 
active possession and use of the land over a period of years), and (4) the practice (developed by Julius 
Caesar then carried to its extreme by Augustus and his successors) of assigning land-ownership to veteran 
soldiers as a reward for their service, the Roman ager publicus was transformed into privately-owned land, 
or its equivalent in the form of long-term, inheritable leaseholds.
  Nevertheless, even if he later expressed a reluctance to use the same conceptual categories in 
describing the Roman developments, Weber seems to have continued to adhere to the position expressed 
in his dissertation concerning the fundamental nature and implications of the developments.   
148
                                                     
142   See WEBER, DIE RÖMISCHE AGRARGESCHICHTE, supra note 105, at 107-40. 
  The combination of certain, 
enforceable boundaries across such a vast expanse of land, along with the long-term property interests 
provided by formal ownership or long-term, inheritable and transferable possession under leaseholds of 
various kinds, enabled an extensive commerce in land-titles to emerge, with the result that Rome became 
143   See id.  See also CAMPBELL, supra note 109, at xxvii-xliv. 
144   See WEBER, DIE RÖMISCHE AGRARGESCHICHTE, supra note 105, at 107-40. 
145   See id. at 122-23, 135, 139-40. 
146   See WEBER, DIE RÖMISCHE AGRARGESCHICHTE, supra note 105, at 141-296. 
147   See id; Jürgen Deininger, Einleitung, in WEBER, DIE RÖMISCHE AGRARGESCHICHTE, supra note 105, at 17-19. 
148   See THE AGRARIAN SOCIOLOGY OF ANCIENT CIVILIZATIONS, supra note 112, at 329. 
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B.  Agrarian Property-Relations in Antiquity: Later Works 
 
 Many of the themes emerging from Weber’s Habilitation would emerge in later work as well.  In 
1896-1898, Weber published works on the demise of ancient culture and agrarian relations in antiquity, 
followed in 1909 by a final essay on agrarian relations in antiquity.150  The works on agrarian relations in 
antiquity and the demise of ancient culture were collected together and published posthumously by 
Marianne Weber in 1924.151  Judging by the book-length essay on agrarian relations in antiquity, Weber 
continued to believe that the emergence of extensive land-ownership and long-term leaseholds in the late 
Roman Republic, which was enabled to a great extent by the Roman land-surveyors, was a deeply 
significant event in Roman socio-economic history, both for the Romans themselves and for the medieval 
Europe that would follow.152
As for the origin of the “abstract ownership-concept” itself, which Weber had identified as a 
vitally important object of investigation in his Habilitation,
   
153 he argued in his later work that its “seed” 
(Keim) was to be found in the absolute “father-power” (patria potestas) that was so distinctive and 
characteristic of ancient Rome.154
Weber’s primary point of comparison in articulating this thesis was ancient Greek socio-legal 
culture,
 
155 which scholars continue to believe contained a property-conception analogous to “possession” 
(possessio, Besitz), a concept of “ownership” (dominium, Eigentum) never having developed. 156
                                                     
149    See WEBER, DIE RÖMISCHE AGRARGESCHICHTE, supra note 105, at 187-206.  See also JOHN R. LOVE, 
ANTIQUITY AND CAPITALISM: MAX WEBER AND THE SOCIOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF ROMAN CIVILIZATION 13-22 
(1991); KÄSLER, supra note 14, at 28-31. 
  
Although father-power (the power of a male head-of-extended-household over the household’s members 
150   See KÄSLER, supra note 14, at 243-55. 
151   See WEBER, AGRARVERHÄLTNISSE, supra note 112; THE AGRARIAN SOCIOLOGY OF ANCIENT CIVILIZATIONS, 
supra note 112.   
152   See WEBER, AGRARVERHÄLTNISSE, supra note 112, at 190-288; THE AGRARIAN SOCIOLOGY OF ANCIENT 
CIVILIZATIONS, supra note 112, at 260-386. 
153   See supra note 136 and accompanying text. 
154    See WEBER, AGRARVERHÄLTNISSE, supra note 112, at 201-2; THE AGRARIAN SOCIOLOGY OF ANCIENT 
CIVILIZATIONS, supra note 112, at 274.  On the power of the paterfamilias in ancient Rome, see THE TWELVE 
TABLES, TABLE IV; THE INSTITUTES OF GAIUS, supra note 37, at I.51, I.55; THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN I.9; THE 
DIGEST, supra note 37, at I.6.  See also BORKOWSKI, supra note 37, at 111-19. 
155    See WEBER, AGRARVERHÄLTNISSE, supra note 112, at 201-2; THE AGRARIAN SOCIOLOGY OF ANCIENT 
CIVILIZATIONS, supra note 112, at 274. 
156  See A.R.W. HARRISON, THE LAW OF ATHENS Vol. I 200-5 (Bristol Press ed. 1998) (1968).  On the early Roman 
distinction between dominium and possessio, as these applied to land, see WEBER, AGRARVERHÄLTNISSE, supra note 
112, at 224; THE AGRARIAN SOCIOLOGY OF ANCIENT CIVILIZATIONS, supra note 112, at 301-302. 
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and possessions) seems to have been characteristic of Indo-European socio-legal culture in general,157 the 
distinctive aspect of Roman socio-legal culture was the degree to which collective public (“state”) 
jurisdictional power stopped “on the threshold of the House” (an der Schwelle des Hauses) and 
“Household-law” (Hausrecht), which Weber equated to dominium, was applied to “wives, children, 
slaves and livestock” (familia pecuniaque).158
From this historical vantage-point, one can immediately see why Weber continued to view the 
concept of ownership – with its connections to power, domination, and legal jurisdiction – as being so 
significant when extended to vast expanses of land: here is the source of territorial jurisdiction, combined 
with jurisdiction over persons in a dependent relationship, which was characteristic of medieval socio-
legal culture, particularly the “manorial dominion system.”
   
159
 
  Such power-laden social relationships 
among owners of vast land-expanses, workers who labored on their estates, and emerging political 
organizations continued to excite Weber’s interests throughout his lifetime.   
C.  Agrarian Property-Relations in the Early-Modern Transformation of Central Europe 
 
Although much of his work relating to agrarian economies focused on antiquity, Weber also 
showed great interest in the fading agrarian economies of his own day. 160
                                                     
157   See BENJAMIN W. FORTSON IV, INDO-EUROPEAN LANGUAGE AND CULTURE 17-19 (2004); J.P. MALLORY, IN 
SEARCH OF THE INDO-EUROPEANS: LANGUAGE, ARCHAEOLOGY AND MYTH 122-26 (1989).  The entire storyline of 
Homer’s Odyssey centers around Odysseus’ attempts to return to the household (comprised of wife, son, slaves, 
other material “possessions,” and political/jurisdictional power) of which he is head, while the suitors are meanwhile 
attempting to take it from him.  See THE ODYSSEY Book I. 
  His 1904 presentation to an 
international scholarly congress in St. Louis provides insights with particular relevance to contemporary 
North Americans, in part because it included explicit comparisons with the U.S. agricultural situation, and 
also because it was intentionally crafted to acquaint Americans with the “peculiar” characteristics of 
158    See WEBER, AGRARVERHÄLTNISSE, supra note 112, at 201-2; THE AGRARIAN SOCIOLOGY OF ANCIENT 
CIVILIZATIONS, supra note 112, at 274.  See also BORKOWSKI, supra note 37, at 111-19. 
159    See WEBER, AGRARVERHÄLTNISSE, supra note 112, at 223-88; THE AGRARIAN SOCIOLOGY OF ANCIENT 
CIVILIZATIONS, supra note 112, at 301-66.  See also supra note 140 and accompanying text. 
160   One of Weber’s few forays into survey research was conducted in an effort to understand the conditions of 
agricultural labor in East Germany.  In 1891, Weber was given a commission by the Verein für Sozialpolitik (Social 
Policy Association) to study the condition of agricultural workers in East Germany.  See Keith Tribe, Prussian 
Agriculture – German Politics: Max Weber 1892-7, in KEITH TRIBE, READING WEBER (1989), at 98-9; KÄSLER, 
supra note 14, at 6-7; MARIANNE WEBER, supra 110, at 128-30.  His report was to be based on two successive 
surveys sent by the Verein to East-German landowners, the first of which was directed to 4,000 such landowners 
inquiring into the “local conditions” of agricultural labor, and the second of which followed up with more 
“impressionistic” questions directed to 562 landowners.  See TRIBE, READING WEBER, at 98-99.  Apparently, 2,277 
landowners responded to the first survey, and 291 to the second.  See id. at 99, 125-26 n.26, 29, 31.  Between 1892 
and 1894 Weber published a series of analyses of the survey results, including his final report to the Verein, as well 
as additional expositions on the issue of agricultural workers.  See id. at 101-16. 
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Nineteenth Century Continental European agrarian social relationships.161
In Weber’s time, German agricultural workers were placed in the inferior social class of 
“peasants” (Bäuerin), in sharp contrast to the U.S. “farmers,” who were viewed as entrepreneurial 
agricultural workers.
  In this essay, Weber provided 
an especially cogent theory as to the economic and cultural processes according to which Central Europe 
made the transition from static agrarian societies to dynamic market-based economies.  The transition was 
not complete at the time he was writing, and thus his observations – while tinged at times with an 
unpleasant German nationalism – are invaluable in deciphering certain stages in that transition that may 
no longer be visible from a contemporary vantage-point.   
162   Nevertheless, Weber was quick to point out to his U.S. audience that the 
economic and legal situation of peasants differed greatly between East and West Germany, and had 
changed substantially over the course of Germany’s history.163  The East-German peasant, whose type 
had evolved to a limited extent with the emergence of capitalist agriculture, was the Instmann.164  The 
Instleute were dependents of manorial landowners: the Grundherren of the Grundherrschaft (manorial-
dominion) system.165  This Grundherrschaft system had existed throughout Germany into the Sixteenth 
Century, and it was the manner in which it dissolved that determined the differences between East and 
West German agricultural-conditions.166
 In order to conceptualize the property-relations characterizing the medieval manorial system, it is 
necessary to clear one’s mind of characteristically modern notions of “property rights,” and instead to 
imagine property-relations that involve complex, corresponding rights-and-obligations among persons 
with respect to things, especially land.
 
167
                                                     
161   See Max Weber, Capitalism and Rural Society in Germany, in H.H. GERTH & C. WRIGHT MILLS, FROM MAX 
WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 363-85 (Oxford University Press Paperback ed. 1958) (1946) (adapted from the 
translation of C.W. Seidenadel, published in 1906 along with other presentations given at the Congress in a volume 
titled Congress of Arts and Science, Universal Exposition, St. Louis, under the title “The Relations of the Rural 
Community to other Branches of Social Science”).  For Marianne Weber’s description of their trip to America, see 
Marianne Weber, supra note 110, at 279-304. 
  Although the “lord of the manor” (Grundherr) was the only true 
“owner” (Eigentümer) of the land, the peasants possessed parcels of land under long-term (effectively 
162   See id. at 365. 
163   See id. at 365-85. 
164   See TRIBE, supra note 160, at 102-3; WEBER, supra note 161, at 374-5 (unfortunately the English does not 
provide any indication of Weber’s German terminology, and thus it must be inferred that Weber is describing the 
Instleute here).  See also ECONOMY AND SOCIETY, supra note 113, at 125. 
165   See Weber, supra note 161, at 374-5. 
166   See id. 
167   Although a description of the Grundherrschaft system is implicit throughout Weber’s agricultural writings, he 
mostly assumes that his readers are familiar with that system, and allocates his time to describing the transitions that 
had occurred and were still occurring in his time.  An excellent description of the system, which links it to the 
Roman Imperial period and describes its evolution in great detail, with particular discussion of the German case, is 
provided by Marc Bloch in Feudal Society.  See MARC BLOCH, FEUDAL SOCIETY 173, 241-54, 266-70 (L.A. 
Manyon trans. 1961).  An influential legal conception of property that includes both obligations and rights is found 
in Samuel Pufendorf.  See, e.g., SAMUEL PUFENDORF, ON THE DUTY OF MAN AND CITIZEN 84-104 (Michael 
Silverthorne trans., James Tully ed., Cambridge University Press 1991) (1673). 
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perpetual), inheritable leaseholds (tenures); these leaseholds ideally provided sufficient acreage for a 
home and farmland for sustenance, and were in some cases freely transferable upon payment of an 
investiture fee.168  In addition to the peasants’ tenures and the landowner’s home, the overall territorial 
estate was divided into subcategories, based on the varying rights and obligations attached to the type of 
land.169  Although the demesne was exclusively the manorial lord’s cultivatable land, other types of land 
(e.g. “arable,” “meadow”) could be cultivated by the peasant as well, subject to the preemptive right of 
the lord.170  The tenured peasants owed certain labor duties to the lord, such as working his demesne for a 
set number of days in the year, as well as rents (sometimes also described as “taxes”), but the lord was 
also subject to obligations with respect to the peasants: in addition to recognizing their tenure on his estate, 
the lord was considered their protector, a role that was perhaps typically exercised through the lord’s 
manorial courts.171
 Despite its inequalities, this Grundherrschaft system had the benefit of producing a relative unity 
of material-economic interest among the landlord and his tenured peasants: both benefited when the 
manor was productive.
 
172  Nevertheless, “maximization of production” was not the overriding goal: in 
Weber’s words, the question asked according to this form of social order was “How can I give, on this 
piece of land, work and sustenance to the greatest possible number of men?”173  This socio-economic and 
legal order would begin to collapse around the Sixteenth Century, but according to very different 
processes in East versus West Germany.174
 The decisive difference between East and West Germany, according to Weber, lay in the 
landowners’ response to capitalism’s driving force: the individual motivation to maximize profit.
 
175  In 
southern and western Germany, the landowners responded to this motivating force by requiring increased 
payments from the peasants, but they did not appropriate the peasants’ tenures.176
                                                     
168   See BLOCH, supra note 167, at 173, 241-54. 
  In Germany’s northeast, 
169   See id. 
170   See id. 
171   See id. 
172   See Max Weber, Privatenqueten über die Lage der Landarbeiter, 4 Mitteilungen des Evangelisch-sozialen 
Kongresses 3 (1892), as quoted in TRIBE, supra note 160.  This insight can be readily translated into the modern 
economic language of the “property-rights“ literature by noting that this structure combined fixed rents with a form 
of share-cropping, the latter of which has been argued to produce the smallest deadweight losses in production.  See, 
e.g. YORAM BARZEL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS, supra note 2, at 33-54. 
173   See WEBER, supra note 161, at 367. 
174   See id. at 373-85. 
175   See WEBER, supra note 161, at 374-5.  In the year following this presentation, 1904-1905, Weber published The 
Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism in the Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik.  See MAX 
WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM (Richard Swedberg ed. 2009); see also KÄSLER, 
supra note 14, at 251.  For Weber’s later elaboration on a conception of “capitalism” as acquisition motivated by the 
desire for profit, see ECONOMY AND SOCIETY, supra note 8, at 90-100. 
176   See WEBER, supra note 161, at 374-6. 
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however, the landowners appropriated (“enclosed”) the peasants’ tenures and began to cultivate the land 
themselves, hiring certain of the dispossessed peasants as laborers to work the soil for wages.177
 The reasons for differing landowner responses to agricultural capitalism in the Northeast versus 
the South and West were varied, but could be distilled into certain common cultural, legal, and economic 
factors.
   
178  From the perspective of culture, Germany’s northeast had been characteristically affected by a 
combination of west-German colonization and Slavic patriarchy, which was distinctive in its idealization 
of the feudal knight (approximated most closely by the aristocratic Junkers) and its lack of legal customs 
protecting the peasantry.179  Furthermore, from a legal perspective, the Northeast was distinctive in the 
degree to which jurisdictional boundaries aligned with proprietary and territorial boundaries, a condition 
that enabled manorial lords to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over their peasants.180
 In Weber’s view, however, it was the economic differences that were most important in 
determining the landowners’ response to agricultural capitalism.
 
181  In the South and West, population 
was much denser, and there were many more market centers in the form of towns and cities.182  The 
communication and financial exchange that occurred in these market centers was culturally significant, as 
well as economically, because it inculcated the knowledge and desire necessary to enable peasants to 
increase their agricultural yields.183  Moreover, the geography was much more differentiated in the South 
and West, which enabled a greater variety of agricultural cultivation.184  All of these conditions enabled 
local trade to flourish in the South and West, which meant that the peasants had local markets in which to 
sell their wares in exchange for money to pay rents and taxes to the landowners.185
 Thus, in southern and western Germany, the economic conditions were such that landowners did 
not need to appropriate the peasants’ tenures; the landowners could simply require higher taxes and rents 
from the peasants, and the presence of local trade meant that the peasants had the knowledge and capacity 
to raise the funds needed to make the increased payments.
   
186  In the Northeast, however, conditions were 
entirely different: the geography was relatively undifferentiated, land-holdings were much more extensive, 
and market-centers in the form of cities and towns were few and far between.187
                                                     
177   See id. 
  For these reasons, it 
178   See id. at 376. 
179   See id. 
180   See id. at 376-77.  In contrast, in the South and West, proprietary-territorial boundaries and jurisdictional 
boundaries were all mixed up, with the result that peasants interacted with many different manorial lords, and thus 
no single lord was able to exercise the same degree of power over peasants.  See id. 
181   See id. at 377. 
182   See id. 
183   See id. at 377-79. 
184   See id. at 377-78. 
185   See id. 
186   See id. 
187   See id. at 378-80. 
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would have been impossible for the peasants to increase their payments, and the landowners’ only option 
was to raise the agricultural yield by cultivating the land themselves. 188  In order to do so, it was 
necessary to appropriate the land entirely, and thus to dispossess the peasants, thereby transforming the 
Eastern peasantry into property-less laborers.189
 In Weber’s view, these cultural, legal, and economic factors determined the shape of capitalist 
agricultural-transformation in Germany, so that by the time of the French and German Revolutions (1789-
99 and 1848, after which peasants were formally regarded as being “free”), the shape of this 
transformation had already been determined.
 
190   From the perspective of public administration, and 
because he believed passionately that Germany should be a strong nation-state, Weber found the Eastern 
agricultural situation untenable.191  Although he argued that additional empirical study was needed in 
order to accurately assess the impact of this capitalistic agricultural transformation on peasant social-
psychological motivations, he believed it was driving the German peasantry to emigrate from the 
Northeast, either into German cities or to America, in alarming numbers.192  This meant that migrant 
workers, in particular Polish workers, were being brought onto the Northeastern estates during the labor-
intensive periods of the agricultural cycle.193  Weber saw this regular influx of non-German workers as 
being extremely harmful to German national self-interest, both defensively and culturally.194
 Although he did not cast the East-German landowners (the Junkers) as villains for their response 
to capitalistic forces in agriculture, he did see their cultural and economic interests as working against the 
German nation’s interests.
 
195  With respect to distribution of Northeastern landed property, he believed 
that the German nation had a responsibility to expropriate portions of the Junkers’ land in order to 
establish smaller agricultural holdings in the form of leases from the state.196  This put Weber in direct 
opposition to the Junkers, an opposition consistent with his advocacy for free exchanges (Börsen) for 
agricultural commodities, securities, and derivatives (including commodity futures).197
 
 
                                                     
188   See id. 
189   See id. 
190   See id. at 365, 374. 
191   See id. at 381-85; TRIBE, supra note 160, at 101-22. 
192   See TRIBE, supra note 160, at 101-22. 
193   See id. 
194   See id.  See also Max Weber, Developmental Tendencies in the Situation of East Elbian Rural Labourers (Keith 
Tribe trans., as published in TRIBE, supra note 160, at 158-84). 
195   See WEBER, supra note 161, at 368-69, 373-74, 381-85; TRIBE, supra note 160, at 101-22.  See also Max Weber, 
Wahlrecht und Demokratie in Deutschland (1917), as published in GESAMMELTE POLITISCHE SCHRIFTEN (1921), at 
277-322, translated and republished in H.H. GERTH & C. WRIGHT MILLS, FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN 
SOCIOLOGY 386-95 (Oxford University Press Paperback ed. 1958) (1946). 
196   See Max Weber, Developmental Tendencies in the Situation of East Elbian Rural Labourers, supra note 194, at 
184. 
197   See Knut Borchardt, Max Weber’s Writings on the Bourse: Puzzling Out a Forgotten Corpus, 2 MAX WEBER 
STUDIES 139 (2002); Keith Tribe, Review: Max Weber Börsenwesen, 2 MAX WEBER STUDIES 242 (2002). 
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D.  Commercial Property-Relations in the Modern World: 
The Bourse Writings 
 
 Weber’s writings on the Bourse were extensive, as is evidenced by the fact that they fill two 
volumes of the Max Weber Gesamtausgabe. 198  That these articles were written in the 1890s is no 
coincidence, for it was during this period that securities and commodities exchanges were becoming an 
issue of great socio-legal and economic significance, not only in Germany but also in North America.199  
In Germany, commissions were established to study the exchanges, the primary question being how and 
whether such exchanges should be regulated at a national level.200
 Utilizing data gathered by the Börsenenquetekommission, Weber took the position that the 
exchanges would be beneficial to German agriculture and agriculturally-related industry.
   
201
 Weber addressed both major types of exchange: securities (Effekten, Fonds) and commodities 
(Produkten, Waren) exchanges.
  Nevertheless, 
he noted that the forms of commercial property being established through these exchanges were 
characterized by vastly-different social relationships, relationships that were distinctive in their 
impersonality, and in the degree to which they posed financial danger to the unwary. 
202  However, it was the latter that seem to have presented the greatest 
difficulties politically.203  In particular, the issue of “grain futures” was a matter of deep controversy, and 
by taking sides on this issue Weber set himself up in opposition to the politically-powerful Junkers.204
 As Weber had noted in his address to the international scholars assembled in St. Louis, the 
Junkers had become powerful voices for agricultural protectionism.
   
205  Because they perceived grain 
futures markets as threatening their ability to control grain prices, and as potentially introducing great 
instability into grain markets, they preferred that such financial instruments be prohibited altogether.206
                                                     
198    See MAX WEBER GESAMTAUSGABE I/5 (Knut Borchardt & Cornelia Meyer-Stoll eds. 1999) (hereinafter 
“Collected Bourse-Writings”). 
  
The Junkers were supported in this objective by the fact that jurists were embroiled in controversy over 
199    See generally Einleitung, COLLECTED BOURSE-WRITINGS, supra note 198.  For the U.S. history, see JONATHAN 
BARRON BASKIN & PAUL J. MIRANTI, JR., A HISTORY OF CORPORATE FINANCE 127-66 (1997); CHARLES R. GEIST, 
WALL STREET: A HISTORY 124-51 (1997).  For more specific discussions of commodities markets, see Armando T. 
Belly, The Derivative Market in Foreign Currencies and the Commodity Exchange Act: The Status of Over-the-
Counter Futures Contracts, 71 TUL. L. REV. 1455, 1460-63 (1997); William L. Stein, The Exchange-Trading 
Requirement of the Commodity Exchange Act, 41 VAN. L. REV. 473, 474-78 (1988).  For a representation of the way 
U.S. lawyers perceived futures markets in the late 1800’s, see 3 The Central Law Journal 121, 134-35 (Seymour D. 
Thompson ed., February 25, 1876). 
200   See Einleitung, COLLECTED BOURSE-WRITINGS, supra note 198, at 3-5, 25-91. 
201   See id. at 66-74, 91-108; see also BORCHARDT, supra note 197, at 141-42. 
202   See, e.g., Die Börse I, Zweck und äußere Organisation der Börsen, in COLLECTED BOURSE-WRITINGS, supra 
note 198, at 141-43 (English translation available in 29 THEORY & SOC. 305 (Steven Lestition trans. 2000)). 
203   See BORCHARDT, supra note 197, at 159-62; TRIBE, supra note 197, at 242-45. 
204   See id. 
205   See Weber, supra note 161, at 382; supra note 161 and accompanying text. 
206   See BORCHARDT, supra note 197, at 159-62; TRIBE, supra note 197, at 242-45. 
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how futures contracts should be legally categorized; because such trades are most often completed 
without exchange of the underlying commodity and involve a certain degree of speculation regarding the 
direction of future commodity prices, a dominant legal perspective of the time was that such contracts 
were a form of gambling, and thus void (i.e. unenforceable).207
 In retrospect, Weber seems extraordinarily far ahead of his time in arguing that, rather than 
destabilizing grain prices, grain futures would have the opposite effect: that through the “arbitrage” of 
professional futures traders, the cyclical rise and fall in grain prices resultant from seasonal gluts and 
dearths would be stabilized, and the cash price for grain would reflect general information about the grain 
market as opposed to merely cyclical or local conditions of supply-and-demand.
   
208
From the perspective of this article, however, Weber’s technical arguments concerning the 
functioning and effects of the Bourse are less significant than his discussion of the overall impact that the 
growing financial markets were having, and would continue to have, on property-relations.  These 
developments were particularly emphasized in Weber’s Börse I essay.
   
209
Weber began that essay by stating that “[t]he Bourse is an institution (Einrichtung) of modern, 
high-volume, commercial trade (Großhandelsverkehr).”
   
210  After outlining the basic forms and functions 
of the Bourse, he then turned to a discussion of bond markets, which were historically the first 
“securities” to emerge.211  He discussed the fact that these markets enabled the possessory-classes “to 
invest their property” (ihr Vermögen anlegen) and the state, in turn, to raise funds needed for public 
projects.212
                                                     
207   See BORCHARDT, supra note 197, at 152-53.  A similar debate took place in America.  See, e.g., The Central 
Law Journal 121, 134-35 (Seymour D. Thompson ed., February 25, 1876) (reporting on the case of Lehman Bros. v. 
Strassberger, United States Circuit Court for the District of Alabama 1875). 
  The implications of this development for property-relations, the relationship between the 
owner of the security (the bond) and the obligor (the state or a corporation), are extremely significant: it is 
208   See Max Weber, Die Börse II, Der Börsenverkehr, in COLLECTED BOURSE-WRITINGS, supra note 198, at 651-55 
(English translation available in 29 THEORY & SOC. 339 (Steven Lestition trans. 2000)).  This is the contemporary 
argument for the benefit of futures markets generally.  For a statement of the contemporary argument, which 
provides more technical detail but tracks Weber’s argument conceptually, see FRANK J. FABOZZI & FRANCO 
MODIGLIANI, CAPITAL MARKETS: INSTITUTIONS AND INSTRUMENTS 163-87 (3d ed. 2003). 
209   Die Börse I, Zweck und äußere Organisation der Börsen, in COLLECTED BOURSE-WRITINGS, supra note 198, at 
135-74 (English translation available in 29 THEORY & SOC. 305 (Steven Lestition trans. 2000)).  For a discussion of 
this essay in relation to Weber’s other works pertaining to the Bourse, see BORCHARDT, supra note 197; TRIBE, 
supra note 197. 
210   See Die Börse I, Zweck und äußere Organisation der Börsen, in COLLECTED BOURSE-WRITINGS, supra note 
198, at 135 (English translation available in 29 THEORY & SOC. 305 (Steven Lestition trans. 2000)). 
211   See id. at 143-55.  On the history of Anglo-American finance and securities markets, see BASKIN & MIRANTi, 
supra note 199, at 55-124. 
212   See Die Börse I, Zweck und äußere Organisation der Börsen, in COLLECTED BOURSE-WRITINGS, supra note 
198, at 147 (English translation available in 29 THEORY & SOC. 305 (Steven Lestition trans. 2000)). 
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the impersonality (Unpersönlichkeit) of these relations that is their most important (sociological) 
characteristic.213
Weber uses the term Herrschaft in this context, which is significant for two reasons: first because 
he is describing a transition from an older form of Herrschaft, that of the Grundherr,
   
214 and second 
because he seems to be simultaneously evoking a legal sense (as a translation for dominium, i.e. 
“ownership”) and a more sociological sense, that of “domination” (or authority).215  In describing the 
transition from Grundherrschaft to “Herrschaft ‘des Kapitals’” Weber describes a transition from a 
hierarchical and personal property-relation, characteristic of a by-gone era, to a property-relation that is 
impersonal and less hierarchical, characteristic of the capitalistic era.216
The transition from agrarian property-relations to commercial property-relations parallels the 
transition from patriarchy and patrimony to bureaucracy and modern, rational capitalism.
   
217
Weber’s exploration of domination (authority) as a sociological type concept would come later, in 
his sociological phase. 
  Indeed, the 
point may very well be that these are the same transition, viewed through different conceptual 
frameworks.  Remembering that dominium is the Latin word for ownership, as well as 
mastership/lordship (comparable to the German Herrschaft), we may be struck anew by the overlap 
between property and domination that Weber and his classically-trained contemporaries would have 
intuited immediately through the evocations of language.   
 
E.  Significance of Weber’s Economic-Historical Phase for a Sociological Theory of Property 
 
In Weber’s economic-historical phase, strictly economic and material aspects of property-
relations receive an especially vivid presentation.  Agrarian property – property connected to land and its 
profits – forms the base of a conceptual framework, with commercial property (financial instruments, 
business “goodwill,” trade secrets) comprising a transitional development that is sketched to illuminate 
contrasts or to hint at future implications.  Land is an embodied (corporeal) and tangible object of 
property, as are the beings (animal and human) who work it and the improvements placed upon it.  
Weber’s agrarian property-relations are personal, hierarchical, and materially-rooted social relationships.  
Out from the richly-portrayed material and economic details, however, Weber abstracted a 
number of interesting cultural theses.  Firstly, that it was an “ideational shift” that produced the 
                                                     
213   See id. at 148.   
214   See supra notes 140, 165-173 and accompanying text. 
215   See Die Börse I, Zweck und äußere Organisation der Börsen, in COLLECTED BOURSE-WRITINGS, supra note 198, 
at 148 (English translation available in 29 THEORY & SOC. 305 (Steven Lestition trans. 2000)). 
216   See id. 
217   See WEBER, supra note 8, at 941-1110. 
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motivational force for Rome’s vast land-acquisitions on the European continent, and that this was due to 
incentives created by Roman public and administrative law.  Secondly, that the “abstract ownership 
concept” is to be credited to Roman legal culture, with its distinctively-potent, patriarchal, “private” 
sphere of unfettered personal power over dependent persons and objects.  Thirdly, that the ability to 
communicate knowledge and ideas to one another in local markets helped West German peasants increase 
their production capacities significantly enough to pay increased taxes on their small plots of land, 
thereby mitigating the perceived necessity for appropriation by capitalistically-driven manorial lords. 
Continuing a theme from his legal phase, Weber’s economic-historical phase presents property as 
a social phenomenon, a phenomenon characterized by social relationships organized around specified 
“rights” and “duties” vis-à-vis valued things.  In his economic-historical phase, however, Weber added a 
richness of detail concerning a concrete manifestation of property that has been common and 
economically-important throughout history, namely agrarian property.   
In pointing to significant contrasts with commercial property, which was rapidly becoming more 
important in his own day, Weber revealed the contours of a “great transformation,”218 one that can be 
viewed as paralleling and complementing those revealed by his sociological contemporaries.219  As with 
Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels,220
To more fully glimpse the wealth of insight in Weber’s sociological theory of property, we now 
turn to the final phase of his development, the sociological phase.  Here we see the final, sociological 
articulation of his theory of property, namely that property is dependent on organized social relationships 
that have been closed to “outsiders.”  And here we see the extent to which Weber’s final development as 
a sociological thinker built on his earlier phases of development, the legal and the economic-historical.   
 Weber’s great transformation accords causal force to property in 
society.  However, with Weber the concept of property is given fuller treatment, both analytically and 
empirically.  Compared to Weber, Marx’s theoretical conceptualization of property is exogenous (i.e., it is 
taken as given) and monolithic (private property in the form of ownership is all that is contemplated).  
Weber’s theory of property brings property into the theory of social relationships (the theory 
“endogenizes” property), and it allows for much more concrete detail in the diversity of rights (use, ability 
to profit, possession, and ownership) and obligations comprising property.   
                                                     
218   The phrase “great transformation” is borrowed from Karl Polanyi’s work of that title.  See KARL POLANYI, THE 
GREAT TRANSFORMATION: THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF OUR TIME (Second Beacon Paperback 
edition 2001) (1944). 
219   See EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY (Free Press paperback edition 1997) (1893); KARL 
MARX & FREDERICK ENGELS, THE COMMUNIST MANIFESTo (Prometheus Books 1988) (English edition of 1888); 
KARL MARX, CAPITAL VOLUME 1 (Frederick Engels ed., International Publishers New World Paperbacks edition 
1967) (English edition of 1887); KARL MARX, ECONOMIC AND PHILOSOPHIC MANUSCRIPTS OF 1844 (Martin 
Milligan trans., Prometheus Books 1988) (1844). 
220    See supra note 219; see also FREDERICK ENGELS, OUTLINES OF A CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 
(Prometheus Books 1988) (1844). 
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IV.  The Sociological Phase:  
Property and Organized Social Closure 
 
  
As the first decade of the Twentieth Century ended, Weber directed his attention to sociology.  In 
1904, he had joined Edger Jaffé and Werner Sombart in assuming editorial control of the Archiv für 
Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik (Archive for Social Science and Social Policy), and in the same year 
his essay on the “Objectivity of Social-scientific and Socio-political Knowledge” had appeared in that 
periodical.221  In 1909 Weber co-founded the German Sociological Association (Deutsche Gesellschaft 
für Soziologie), and began to occasionally refer to himself as a “sociologist.”222
Early in that same year, he accepted an invitation to serve as editor for a project to assemble a 
compendium of foundational concepts and principles for “social economics” (Grundriss der 
Sozialökonomik, hereinafter the “Outline of Social Economics”).
   
223   This work was conceived as a 
replacement for a previous Handbook of Political Economy (Handbuch der Politischen Ökonomie), 
which the publisher viewed as being somewhat out of date in relation to contemporary developments in 
German and Austrian economics.224
Between 1910 and 1914, Weber expended considerable effort in assembling contributions by 
German and Austrian economists to the Outline of Social Economics,
 
225 and in composing his own 
contributions to the Outline.226  In his correspondence and in his manuscript footnotes, Weber referred to 
his contributions as Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft – Economy and Society – and this is the title under which 
Weber’s manuscripts written for the Outline during this period were posthumously published.227
                                                     
221   See KÄSLER, supra note 14, at 13. 
  The 
early manuscripts (written between 1910 and 1914) include what is now published as “Part Two: The 
222   See id. at 15.  Weber did express ambivalence about the emerging discipline of sociology, however, and finally 
withdrew in frustration from the German Sociological Association.  See SWEDBERG, supra note 8, at 173; see also 
MARIANNE WEBER, supra note 110, at 420-25. 
223   See SWEDBERG, supra note 8, at 199; see also RICHARD SWEDBERG, THE MAX WEBER DICTIONARY 109-11 
(2005).  The term “social economics” was apparently suggested by the publisher in an effort to avoid litigation that 
might be initiated by the heirs of Gustav Schönberg, author of the famous Handbook of Political Economy that 
Weber’s Outline of Social Economics was to replace.  See SWEDBERG, supra note 8, at 199-201.  Weber liked the 
term “social economics,” nevertheless, writing in a letter dated March 22, 1912 that it is “the best name for the 
discipline [of economics].”  Id. at 297 n. 122.  
224   See SWEDBERG, supra note 8, at 199-201.  Despite his increasing interest in sociology, however, Weber’s 
scholarly engagement continued to be primarily that of an economist, albeit an economist who (consistent with the 
nature of the German economic discipline of his time) conceived of the economic sphere as situated within – and, 
therefore, analytically and causally connected to – broader social and cultural contexts, including those of politics, 
law, and religion.  See id. at 173-206. 
225  Weber saw a need to incorporate both the historical perspective (then dominant in German economics) and the 
analytical perspective (then identified with Austrian economic theory) in the understanding and explanation of 
socio-economic phenomena.  See Swedberg, supra note 8, at 173-206. 
226   See WOLFGANG SCHLUCHTER, RATIONALISM, RELIGION, AND DOMINATION: A WEBERIAN PERSPECTIVE 433-63 
(1989); see also Swedberg, supra note 8, at 199-203. 
227   See Schluchter, supra note 226, at 459-60; Swedberg, supra note 8, at 298 n.126. 
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Economy and the Arena of Normative and De Facto Powers” (hereinafter referred to as the “1914 
Manuscripts”) in the English edition of Economy and Society, edited by Guenther Roth and Claus 
Wittich.228
Weber’s work from this period also includes a 1913 publication in Logos (the International 
Journal for the Philosophy of Culture).
   
229  This 1913 piece (hereinafter the “Logos Essay”) was titled “On 
Some Categories of Interpretive Sociology.”  According to Weber, it served as a counterpart and 
supplement to the conceptual exposition written in 1919-1920, posthumously published as Chapter 1 of 
the finalized manuscripts submitted for publication shortly before Weber’s death in 1920 (hereinafter the 
“1920 Manuscripts”).230
Weber’s Logos Essay articulates precise definitions for sociological categories used throughout 
the 1914 Manuscripts.
 
231   These categories were developed from Rudolf Stammler’s jurisprudential 
exposition on the relationship between law and economics. 232   Nevertheless, although Weber 
acknowledged the extent to which Stammler’s analytical categories served as the starting-point for his 
own exposition, he positioned his contribution in direct opposition to Stammler. 233   Objecting to 
“historical materialism” as an influence on Stammler’s “disastrous” social theory, Weber characterized 




A.  Sociological Categories for Understanding and Explaining Property-Relations 
 
Weber began the Logos Essay with the foundational declaration that human behavior (Verhalten), 
like all empirical occurrences, exhibits two types of observable patterns: (1) regularities of successive 
development (i.e., causal regularities) and (2) relational structures (“complexes” or “compounds,” 
                                                     
228   See Weber, supra note 8, at 309 et seq.; MAX WEBER GESAMTAUSGABE I/22; GUENTHER ROTH, INTRODUCTION, 
in Weber, supra note 8, at LXVI et seq.  For an argument that the 1914 Manuscripts were nearly complete and 
therefore a relatively reliable source, see Orihara, supra note 8. 
229   Weber, GESAMMELTE AUFSÄTZE ZUR WISSENSCHAFTSLEHRE 403-50 (1922); originally published in Band IV 
Logos, Heft 3; see KÄSLER, supra note 14, at 258; an English translation was prepared by Edith E. Graber and 
published in 22 THE SOCIOLOGICAL QUARTERLY 151-80 (1981) (hereinafter referred to as “THE LOGOS ESSAY”). 
230   Weber referred to Chapter 1 of the 1920 Manuscripts as a “simplified” version of the Logos Essay, which he 
evidently still considered the more precise conceptual exposition.  See WEBER, supra note 8, at 3. 
231   See ORIHARA, supra note 8. 
232   WIRTSCHAFT UND RECHT: NACH MATERIALISTISCHER GESCHICHTSAUFFASSUNG (Eilbron Classics 2006) (1906).  
For Weber’s discussion of his use of Stammler, see WEBER, supra note 229, at n.1.  For a discussion of Stammler’s 
(as well as a number of other legal theorists’) influence on Weber, see STEPHEN P. TURNER & REGIS A. FACTOR, 
MAX WEBER: THE LAWYER AS SOCIAL THINKER (1994). 
233   See WEBER, supra note 229, at n.1; THE LOGOS ESSAY, supra note 229, at n.1. 
234   See id. 
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Zussamenhänge).235  What makes human behavior unique, however, is the fact that it has meaning (Sinn) 
to the actors who engage in the behavior.236  For this reason, these empirical patterns can be interpretively 
explained on the basis of certain types of inferred intentional orientation that cause actions by individuals 
to exhibit regularities in relational structure and course of development.237
These types of intentional orientation can be understood as patterns of directedness in 
consciousness, cognition, and thought, i.e. in the formation of meaning and intention.  They do not 
include all the unique content of a particular individual’s thoughts, emotions, or motivations.
   
238  Rather, 
they are general forms of thought, ways of conceptualizing choices, possibilities of action, and 
probabilities of success. 239   These types of intentional orientation are inferentially interpretable by 
sociologists when their patterns of directedness are (1) social (oriented to others in meaning and action) 
and (2) purposive (goal-oriented).240
The type of intentionally-oriented social behavior that can be interpreted (inferred) with the 
greatest degree of validity and certainty by sociologists is behavior that is rational in the sense that the 
individual instrumentally and calculatingly uses scarce means to achieve a valued end.
   
241  In order to 
arrive at a valid interpretation, a sociologist can use this type of social action as a starting-point for 
analysis, explaining deviations on the basis of external causal factors and/or differences in meaningful 
intention that led to the deviational empirical pattern.242
Although he had some interest in isolated instances of social action, Weber’s primary interest was 
in patterns of ongoing socio-relational structures: social groupings and their course of development over 
time.  This is particularly evident in the Logos Essay and the 1914 Manuscripts, where Weber refers to 
social action as “communal action” (Gemeinschaftshandeln) and organizes his discussion on the basis of 
differing types of social grouping: household, family, kinship, and neighborhood communities, ethnic and 
racial communities, religious, political and hierocratic communities, class-based-associations, status-
communities, and the market.
 
243
                                                     
235   See WEBER, supra note 229, at 403-4; THE LOGOS ESSAY, supra note 229, at 151. 
  According to Weber, these distinctive types of social grouping are 
236   See id. 
237   WEBER, supra note 229, at 403-17; THE LOGOS ESSAY, supra note 229, at 151-9. 
238   See id. 
239   See id. 
240   See id. 
241   See id. 
242   See id.  In Chapter 1 of the 1920 Manuscripts, Weber defined this kind of meaningful, other-oriented behavior 
as “social action.”  See WEBER, supra note 8, at 4-22. 
243   See WEBER, supra note 229; THE LOGOS ESSAY, supra note 229; WEBER, supra note 8, at 339 et seq.; MAX 
WEBER, WIRTSCHAFT UND GESELLSCHAFT 181 et seq. (1925).  In both the 1920 Manuscripts and the 1914 
Manuscripts, Weber was careful to state that a shared “class situation,” and especially a common situation in relation 
to possession of property, is not sufficient to produce the conscious, mutual social orientation that characterizes a 
communal or associative social relationship.  However, under certain circumstances a conscious, mutual social 
orientation might arise out of a common possessory situation, in which case a class-based communal or associative 
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characterized by their distinctive relationship-structures, courses of development, and by the patterns of 
directedness in meaning that condition these relationship-structures and courses of development.244
Later, in Chapter 1 of the 1920 Manuscripts, Weber refined his categories of social grouping, 
moving to a more abstract level in distinguishing two types of “social relationships”: “associative” 
(Vergesellschaftung) and “communal” (Vergemeinschaftung).
   
245  The difference between these two rests 
on the meaning that social actors impute to the social relationship.  In the case of communal social 
relationships, actors subjectively regard the members of the community as “belonging together,” whereas 
in the case of associative social relationships, actors regard the social relationship as a necessary means 
for achieving a shared goal.246
Viewing social relationships from this clearly-delineated and abstracted perspective, Weber 
continued to view such relationships as being characterized by their distinctive relationship-structures, 
while also emphasizing patterns in the directedness in meaning that condition these relationship-structures 
and their courses of development. 
   
One of the most important patterns of directedness in meaning emerges out of the shared 
orientation to an “Order” (Ordnung) by the members of a social relationship.247  In his 1913 Logos Essay, 
Weber distinguished two types of “Foundational Order”.248  The first type is both fundamentally and 
formally hierarchical, in the sense that it results from unilateral demands issued by some person(s) and 
complied with by others.249  The second type is formally egalitarian, in the sense that it results from a 
mutual declaration issuing from all persons to one another.250
Only in the most purely rational, limiting cases will these Foundational Orders – their concepts, 
principles, and rules (Ordnungen) – be explicitly articulated in written documents formally constituting 
the social relationship, i.e. in a constitution or charter, and/or in other bylaws, regulations and contractual 
documents.
   
251
                                                                                                                                                                           
social relationship could arise.  See WEBER, supra note 8, at 302 et seq. and 927 et seq.  For further discussion of 
classes and status-communities, see infra notes 332 to 341 and accompanying text. 
  Moreover, the ways that particular individuals orient themselves to an Order (with its 
244   See id.   
245   See WEBER, supra note 8, at 40-43. 
246   See id.  Weber referred to Ferdinand Tönnies’ “pioneering work” Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft (2d ed. 1912) 
in explaining his shift to using these conceptual categories.  See id. at 41; see also supra note 98 and accompanying 
text. 
247   In the 1920 Manuscripts, Weber shifted his terminology slightly, adding categories for “types of action 
orientation” (Usage, Custom, and Interest-Conditioned), and discussing the bases upon which actors attribute 
“legitimacy” to an Order.  See id. at 29-38.  Despite this slight shift in terminology, Weber’s discussion of Order in 
the 1920 Manuscripts reveals fundamental continuity with his discussion in the Logos Essay and the 1914 
Manuscripts.  See also infra note 293 and accompanying text. 
248   See THE LOGOS ESSAY, supra note 229, at 160-66. 
249   See id. 
250   See id. 
251   See id. 
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associated concepts, principles, and rules) may be by refusing to comply with it, or by covertly deviating 
from it (e.g. cheating in a game of cards).252
Nevertheless, an Order should be treated as being empirically “in force” (Geltung) to the extent 
that individuals expect other individuals to behave in accordance with the Order.
   
253  This concept of the 
degree to which an Order is empirically “in force” was carried over to the 1920 Manuscripts, where 
Weber defined it as the “probability” (Chance) that social action will be conditioned by the Order.254
Mutual orientation to an Order is vitally-important to social action because it helps individuals to 
form reasoned expectations as to what their social “others” will do, thereby enabling them to calculate 
their own probabilities of success in achieving a particular goal, 
 
255 or to deliberately conform to a 
command they view as binding on them.  To the extent that an Order is believed to exist and is 
empirically in force, therefore, it plays a causal role in the social action of individuals, contributing to 
patterns of directedness in meaning and in the formation of socio-relational structures.256
Having drawn on Weber’s Logos Essay and the 1920 Manuscripts to elaborate certain key 
concepts in Weber’s sociology, we can now turn to his sociological theory of property. 
   
 
B.  Weber’s Sociological Theory of Property 
 
Weber discussed property-related concepts in two sections of the Logos Essay.  The first 
discussion is provided in the section of the essay addressing “Associational Action”,257 while the second 
discussion is provided in the section of the essay addressing “Consensus” (Einverständnis).258
                                                     
252   See id. 
  These are 
253   See id.  Cheating, for example, is most effective when the other players are following the rules; on the other 
hand, cheating becomes logically impossible when there are no rules.  See id. 
254   See WEBER, supra note 8, at 31.  In the 1920 Manuscripts, Weber complemented focus on the degree to which 
an Order is empirically “in force” (Geltung, often translated as “valid”) with focus on the Order’s bases for 
“legitimacy.”  See id. at 31-8.  
255   See THE LOGOS ESSAY, supra note 229, at 160-66; WEBER, supra note 8, at 31-8.   
256   See THE LOGOS ESSAY, supra note 229, at 160-66; WEBER, supra note 8, at 31-8.  There is a complex 
convergence in Weber’s scholarship between the concepts of meaning and Order.  One way to disentangle these 
may be to emphasize the notion that an Order is a pattern of directedness in meaning.  On the one hand, from this 
perspective, an Order is a composite in which individual concepts and principles are viewed as being in systematic 
relation to one another; it therefore has the characteristics of a system of meanings.  Indeed the German Ordnung 
was commonly used in legal literature (sometimes as a substitute for the Latin ius) to evoke “the legal system.”  See, 
e.g., Roscoe Pound, The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence, 24 HARV. L. REV. 591, 592n.12 (1911).  
On the other hand, from this perspective, the Order manifests itself empirically in ordered patterns of behavior.  See 
id.  Jurists have tended to see these two elements – an ordered system of legal concepts and rules, and the ordered 
behaviors of flesh-and-blood human beings – as being connected, indeed have sometimes assumed that they are 
necessarily connected.  See id.; see also WIEACKER, supra note 8.  Very likely, Weber’s complex uses of the term 
Ordnung reflect these multivalent evocations in the legal tradition that he absorbed as part of his legal training. 
257   See THE LOGOS ESSAY, supra note 229, at 160-66. 
258   See id. at 166-73.   
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two basic types of socio-relational structure, formed through patterns of communal social action and 
corresponding to two basic types of Order.   
Associational Action is a socio-relational structure formed as a result of relatively-explicitly 
shared purposes; the members agree upon a Foundational Order and related rules that are rationally 
designed to achieve the association’s shared purposes.259  Consensus, on the other hand, characterizes a 
socio-relational structure formed through patterns of communal action oriented to an Order that does not 
arise out of agreement on shared purposes.260  Individuals orient themselves to an Order “as if” it had 
emerged through their agreement on concepts and rules, even though they haven’t actually agreed to 
anything.261
The archetypal form (“ideal type”) of Associational Action, according to Weber, is characterized 
by deliberate (“rational”) agreement on an Order that explicitly defines the substantive capacities and 
means for the collective action of the associates in seeking to achieve the specified purposes.
   
262  The 
resulting association is a Zweckverein, an “intentional-association” (“goal-oriented-association”) or 
“voluntary association.”263  In this ideal-typical form of Associational Action, the foundational agreement 
recording the agreed-upon Order – the “Charter” and By-Laws, or “Constitution” (Satzung) – will specify 
which “tangible goods” (Sachgüter) and “funds” (Leistungen) shall be administered and made available 
for the stipulated purposes of the association. 264  These goods and funds comprise the association’s 
“special purpose fund,” its “designated property” (Zweckvermögen).265
This is the purest, archetypal case of Associational Action, according to Weber.
   
266   His 
description clearly fits a modern corporation, and this may very well be the example that he had in mind.  
However, he went on to describe certain variations that cases of Associational Action might exemplify.  
For example, the agreed-upon Order (the decisive criterion, according to Weber) might be comprised 
merely of ad hoc rules, or there may be no designated staff for authorized action and enforcement.267
                                                     
259   See id. at 160-66. 
  An 
260   See id. at 166-73. 
261   See id. 
262   See id. at 163-65. 
263   See id. at 163.  See also WEBER, supra note 8, at 41. 
264   See THE LOGOS ESSAY, supra note 229, at 163. 
265   See id.  In addition to designating the association’s property, the enacted Order will specify: the types of action 
that the association shall be authorized to execute, the persons (“Executive Bodies,” Vereinsorgane) to whom such 
action shall be attributed, and the consequences that such action shall have for the association; the Executive Bodies 
with responsibility for managing the association’s property, and the way in which such management is to be 
conducted; which services the parties to the association shall provide; which actions by associates are permitted, 
prohibited, and permitted; and the “gains” (Vorteile) that associates might anticipate as a result of their participatory 
investment in the association.  Finally, the enacted Order will specify which Executive Bodies shall be given the 
capacity to enforce the stipulated Order, under which conditions, and by which means (the “Enforcement 
Instruments,” Zwangsapparat).  See id. 
266   See id. 
267   See id. at 163-65. 
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example of such a variant on Associational Action is the monopolistic “cartel,” which is an association of 
independent business entities.268
As an association of independent entities, the cartel has no staff.
   
269  Moreover, its common Order 
may be relatively limited, merely specifying a litany of prescribed or proscribed actions (e.g. prohibiting 
the lowering of prices).270  Nevertheless, because its monopoly power depends on a limitation of the 
number of participants, thereby ensuring exclusivity in relation to valued resource(s) and keeping prices 
high, the “cartel” is an example of a “closed” association.271
Closure against additional participants can occur in associations characterized by mutual 
orientation to an explicitly agreed-upon Order, and in associations characterized by Consensus (action 
oriented “as if” there were an agreed-upon Order).
   
272  What matters is the fact that in both cases there is 
closure against additional participants, thereby creating a de facto monopoly vis-à-vis valued resources.273
In the case of a “syndicate,” there is some degree of ongoing association among otherwise-
independent business entities, thereby creating an ongoing monopoly, i.e. an ongoing closure against 
additional participants vis-à-vis valued resources.
 
274   It is this continued existence in time that 
distinguishes the syndicate from the cartel, according to Weber.275
An ongoing monopoly, enabled by ongoing associational closure against outsiders vis-à-vis 
valued resources, will involve some minimal delineation of rules as to what is prescribed, permitted, or 
prohibited for participants.  Therefore, an Order will be to some degree articulated, and an organizational 
structure will be to some degree created, but this may remain ad hoc rather than being systematized.  
Wherever this ongoing closure against additional participants persists, accompanied as this is by an ad 
hoc Order, the resulting syndicate association will have de facto property (Vermögen), often quite 
extensive.
   
276
The syndicate is a variant of Associational Action characterized by a lack of staff and an ad hoc 
Order.  An even more extreme variant is an isolated, rational exchange (Tausch) of goods.
 
277
The exchange is isolated in the sense that it occurs only one time, and in the absence of any 
explicit or implicit agreed-upon Order, let alone a staff to enforce the Order.  There is thus no ongoing 
“Associational Action” at all.  Nevertheless, even in this extreme case, Weber argued that, at a minimum, 
   
                                                     
268   See id. 
269   See id. 
270   See id. 
271   See id. at 163-65, 172. 
272   See id. at 172. 
273   See id. at 172. 
274   See id. at 163-5, 172. 
275   See id. at 165. 
276   See id. at 163-5, 172. 
277   See id. at 164-5. 
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the parties to the exchange will be making an implicit agreement as to what is prescribed, prohibited, and 
what is permitted.278  Thus, to a very limited extent, an Order will be emergent from the exchange.279  
What is prescribed is the transfer of the exchanged goods, and possibly also the obligation to guarantee 
the continued possession of the transferee(s) against interference by third parties.  What is prohibited is 
the taking-back of possession by the transferor.  What is permitted is the complete and discretionary 
exercise of powers of control (Verfügung) over the goods exchanged.280
The isolated exchange does not create an ongoing association between the parties.  An exchange 
of goods does not result in the emergence of an “enduring structural entity” and therefore it is neither 
“autocephalous” nor “heterocephalous”: there is no structural entity, and therefore there can be no 
organizational “head” (cephal, from the Greek word for head).
 
281  The exchange may occur within the 
context of a broader associational Order, and thus be “heteronomously ordered,” as in the case of the 
“Market” (Markt).282  Or in an extreme case it may be exclusively ordered by the bi-lateral expectations 
of the parties, based on each party’s “trust” (Vertrauen) that the other party will behave in accordance 
with the limited Order emergent from their agreement (autonomously ordered).283
The important point, however, is that in both cases (heteronomous and autonomous exchange), 
the exchange is characterized by an implicit orientation to the action of third parties, parties external to 
the parties’ explicit orientation to one another.
   
284  This renders the exchange a case of Consensus: while 
there is at least an implicit agreed-upon Order between the parties to the exchange, there is no such 
agreed-upon Order in relation to third parties, at least in the case of the autonomously ordered 
exchange.285
In the case of the autonomously ordered exchange, the parties to the exchange assume an “as if” 
Order in relation to third parties.  In other words, their social action is a case of Consensual Action.
   
286  At 
a minimum, the “as if” Order enables the parties to the exchange to orient themselves to the expectation 
that third parties will respect the transfer of possession (Besitzwechsel) that comprises the heart of the 
exchange.287
                                                     
278   See id. 
  In most known historical cases, however, the exchange is heteronomously ordered by some 
279   See id. 
280   See id. 
281   See id. at 165.  See also WEBER, supra note 8, at 48-50. 
282   See THE LOGOS ESSAY, supra note 229, at 165. 
283   See id. 
284   See id. 
285   See id. 
286   See id.  This is a category to which Weber didn’t refer in the 1920 Manuscripts. 
287   See id. 
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type of organized social relationship, the enforcement apparatus of which provides an external guarantee 
against interference by third parties with stable possession of the goods exchanged.288
Stable possession of goods, then, is necessary to exchange of goods.  This stable and reliable 
possession is enabled by the existence of Consensual or Associational Action, corresponding to an “as if” 
or actual Order, which is “in force” by virtue of the enforcement apparatus of some type of social 
community, or at a minimum is assumed by the parties to an isolated exchange.  
   
From this brief exposition in the 1913 Logos Essay, we already see the basic outlines of Weber’s 
sociological theory of property.  Property – here addressed primarily in terms of stable possession of 
goods in exchange and the designated property of an intentional association (Zweckverein) – depends 
upon “Ordered” social closure, that is, closure of a social relationship against additional participants vis-
à-vis valued resources, which occurs as a result of shared orientation to an explicit or implicit Order.  
Significantly, Weber argued that this theory holds true even in the case of isolated exchange.  Either the 
exchange is heteronomously ordered (in which case there is an Order imposed from outside the exchange) 
or the exchange is autonomously ordered (in which case there is an “as if” Order).  But either way the 
parties exhibit patterns of directedness in meaning through patterns in the formation, maintenance, and 
closure of social relationships vis-à-vis one another, third parties, and valued resources.   
An Order is an (inferred) pattern of directedness in meaning that organizes the formation and 
maintenance of communal and associative social relationships, and that directs their closure vis-à-vis 
valued resources.  An Order therefore guides and legitimizes the “organized social closure” that enables 
the formation and persistence of exclusive “rights and obligations” vis-à-vis things, which is characteristic 
of property.  Property and organized social closure are two sides of the same phenomenon.289
 
  And both 
are enabled by mutual orientation to an Order.   
C.  Refining the Theory: The Role of an Order in Organized Social Closure 
 
In a manuscript titled “The Economy and the Orders,” Weber expanded on the relationship 
between social action and Order, and on the distinction between two types of “Order”: (1) that which is 
legally correct according to the principles and logic of jurisprudence (the “Formally-Correct Legal 
Order”), versus (2) that which individuals acting in relation to one another vis-à-vis valued goods and 
                                                     
288   See id. at 172. 
289   The implication is striking: everywhere organized social closure exists, property will exist.  The property may 
not be individual, and it may not be analogous to “ownership,” but there will at least be stable possession of objects. 
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services subjectively regard as being in force and therefore orient themselves to (the “Empirically-Valid 
Legal Order”), with the result that patterns of stable possession and exchange emerge.290
Weber defined the “Economic Order” (Wirtschaftsordnung) as the empirically-observable Order 
that emerges from (i.e. is conditioned by) two distinct factors: (1) the Consensus-based distribution of de 
facto “powers of control and disposal” (Verfügungsgewalt, hereinafter “Dispositional Powers”) over 
goods and economic services, and (2) the ways in which such goods and services are used as a result of 
these de facto Dispositional Powers.
   
291
Weber’s primary goal in this manuscript was to show how, and to what extent, the Empirically-
Valid Legal Order impacts the Economic Order.
   
292  He also discussed various sources for the principles, 
rules, and concepts (Normen) that comprise and supplement the Empirically-Valid Legal Order in a 
particular community, including Conventions, Customs, and Usages, as well as ethics and religion.293  
Whatever these sources might be, the crucial attribute of all principles, rules, and concepts comprising the 
Empirically-Valid Legal Order is the existence of some type of enforcement mechanism, whether this be 
a formally-designated staff or the threat of kinship-vengeance.294
According to Weber, the Empirically-Valid Legal Order may impact an individual’s “interests” 
(Interessen) in a number of ways.
 
295
                                                     
290   See MAX WEBER ON LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 11-40 (edited and translated in part by Max Rheinstein 
1967) (hereinafter “WEBER, SOCIOLOGY OF LAW (RHEINSTEIN’S EDITION)”); Weber, supra note 8, at 311-38. 
  Of particular importance to the economy, however, is the way in 
which the Empirically-Valid Legal Order impacts the individual’s calculation of his chances of stably 
keeping economic goods under his possession and control (Verfügung), or of acquiring such possession 
and control under given conditions in the future, i.e. of maintaining and/or acquiring Dispositional 
291   See WEBER, SOCIOLOGY OF LAW (RHEINSTEIN’S EDITION), at 11-16.  This concept of Dispositional Powers is 
crucial to Weber’s economic sociology, and to the connection that he drew between law and the economy.  This 
comes through with striking clarity in Chapter 2 of the 1920 Manuscripts, where Weber wrote as follows: 
 
It is essential to include the criterion of [Dispositional Powers, Verfügungsgewalt] in the 
sociological concept of economic action, if for no other reason than that at least a modern market 
economy (Erwerbswirtschaft) essentially consists in a complete network of exchange contracts, 
that is, in deliberate planned acquisitions of [Dispositional Powers].  This, in such an economy, is 
the principal source of the relation of economic action to the law.  But any other type of 
organization of economic activities would involve some kind of de facto distribution of 
[Dispositional Powers], however different its underlying principles might be from those of the 
modern private enterprise economy with its legal protection of such powers held by autonomous 
and autocephalous economic units.   
 
WEBER, supra note 8, at 67 (emphasis added, endnote removed). 
292   See WEBER, SOCIOLOGY OF LAW (RHEINSTEIN’S EDITION), supra note 290, at 11-40. 
293   See id; see also supra note 247. 
294   See especially WEBER, SOCIOLOGY OF LAW (RHEINSTEIN’S EDITION), supra note 290, at 25, 39. 
295   See id. at 15 et seq. 
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Powers.296
When the Formally-Correct Legal Order is manipulated and therefore changed, to the extent that 
it is Empirically-Valid by virtue of enforcement, Weber argued that it can impact individual calculations 
as to chances of maintaining and/or acquiring Dispositional Powers in two possible ways: (1) as an 
unintended-effect (Reflexwirkung) of the principle created or manipulated (the articulation of “Objective 
Law”), or (2) as a result of the intentional creation of “Subjective Rights.”
  Indeed, Weber argued, the manipulation of such calculable chances is often what lawmakers 
have in mind when they manipulate the Formally-Correct Legal Order.   
297  The existence of these 
Subjective Rights means that the individual has certain calculable chances of invoking the enforcement 
powers provided by the relevant social community – e.g., the political community – in order to protect 
and enforce her Dispositional Powers.298
For Weber, it was very important that social science (sociology and economics) focus on the 
empirical validity of law, especially the way that this validity impacts the individual through his 
calculation of chances of protecting or acquiring Dispositional Powers.
 
299  He sharply criticized Stammler 
for confusing the Formally-Correct Legal Order with the Empirically-Valid Legal Order.300  In order to 
facilitate the disentanglement of the Formally-Correct Legal Order from the Empirically-Valid Legal 
Order, Weber redefined certain crucial legal categories – possession and obligation – into their 
“economic” forms.  “Possession” (Besitz) in this narrow “economic” sense means simply that the 
possessor can count on a lack of interference with his control (Verfügung) over the thing possessed.301  
An “exchange” of goods means that this control has been transferred, with the expectation that a roughly 
equivalent control over a different good will be provided in return.302
Weber nonetheless continued to argue that the Formally-Correct Legal Order significantly, if 
indirectly, impacts the Empirically-Valid Legal Order.  In the 1920 Manuscripts he stated flatly that the 
importance of a legal order enforced by the “state” for the modern Economic Order, including the 
enforcement of proprietary possession (Besitz) and contractual exchange, cannot be overestimated.
   
303
                                                     
296   See id. 
  He 
was also insistent, however, that the Formally-Correct Legal Order not be treated as exogenous; the 
297   See id. at 15-16.  Weber significantly elaborated on this and related points in later sections of his sociology of 
law.  See id. at 44, 98-197; see also WEBER, supra note 8, at 644, 666-752. 
298   See WEBER, SOCIOLOGY OF LAW (RHEINSTEIN’S EDITION), supra note 290, at 15-16. 
299   See id. at 28-9. 
300   See id.  
301   See id. 
302   See id. 
303   See WEBER, supra note 8, at 65, 67-8. 
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Formally-Correct Legal Order is impacted by economic and cultural changes, albeit through processes 
mediated by the culture of the legal profession and the political community.304
Beginning with the 1914 Manuscripts, Weber focused special attention on the processes 
according to which different types of social groupings tend to become closed against additional 
participants.
     
305  In the progression of this closure, Weber argued, the tendency is almost always to create 
some type of Legal Order to govern allocation and use of valued resource(s) that are monopolized by 
means of the closure against outsiders. 306   When this happens, the social grouping becomes a 
“Community of Legal Rights” (Rechtgemeinschaft), and the participants become “right-bearing 
associates” (Rechtgenossen).307
Weber viewed this “enclosure process” as a type of ever-recurring sequence, and as the basis for 
“Ownership” (Eigentum) of land, as well as all types of economically-important monopolies.
   
308  He 
granted that the objects monopolized can vary widely – from occupational privileges to natural resources 
– depending on the technical nature of the objects and the group’s opportunities for monopolization.309  In 
all such cases, however, group closure results in monopolization vis-à-vis valued resources.  By creating 
monopolized “rights” to valued resources, possessed either by the group as a whole or allocated to 
individuals within the group, this process results in the “Appropriation” of the valued resources; 310
In the 1920 Manuscripts, Weber clarified his discussion of enclosure processes by contrasting 
“open” (or “public”, offen) social relationships with “closed” (geschlossen) social relationships.
  it is 
the source of the creation of “property rights,” including those characteristic of Ownership.  
311  A 
social relationship may become closed for varying reasons, he argued, ranging from tradition (arising 
from ingrained habits) to intentional social action (that is, action in which a social actor’s use of particular 
means is explicitly directed to achieving a particular end, which may be either a moral value or a 
consequentialist-materialist goal).312  Regardless of how the social relationship becomes closed, however, 
the key outcome from a closed social relationship is the “monopolistic” control of “appropriated 
opportunities” (appropriierte Chancen), and these appropriated opportunities are defined as “rights” 
(Rechte).313
                                                     
304  See id. at 29-38, 654-8, 784-808; WEBER, SOCIOLOGY OF LAW (RHEINSTEIN’S EDITION), supra note 290, at 61-4, 
198-223. 
  “Ownership” (Eigentum) emerges where these appropriated rights are transmitted through 
305   See WEBER, supra note 8, at 341-43. 
306   See id. 
307   See id. 
308   See id. 
309   See id. 
310   See id.   
311   See id.  at 43-46. 
312   See id.  For Weber’s discussion of rational, affectual and traditional forms of social action, see id. at 24-6. 
313   See id. at 44.  In Chapter II, Section 2 of the 1920 Manuscripts, Weber substantially refined the notion of what 
comprises appropriated opportunities (Chancen).  He argued that these appropriated opportunities cannot be equated 
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inheritance, either to individuals or to kinship groups.314  If the appropriated rights are freely transferable, 
“free ownership” (freies Eigentum) is present.315
 
 
D.  Further Refining the Theory: Different Modes of Appropriation 
 
In both the 1914 and 1920 Manuscripts, Weber argued that the nature of the goods or useful 
services appropriated through monopolization may have extremely important implications for the 
patterned course of development taken by social-relational groupings, or for a “society” in general.  The 
nature of appropriated goods and services is closely connected to particular “Types of Demand-
Satisfaction”.316
In the 1914 Manuscripts, Weber had emphasized the extent to which the “moveability” of 
appropriated goods conditions the course of development within political communities.
  
317  In his final 
analysis of the processes according to which Appropriation takes place (a discussion that consumes 
approximately 40 pages in Chapter 2 of Economy and Society), Weber focused instead on historical 
differences in the degree to which the services of particular offices are appropriated, i.e. the extent to 
which an individual might have property-related “rights” to a particular job-related position in society, or 
the extent to which he and his labor services might be the property of another person. 318  What is 
appropriated here is a labor position, or labor services, and therefore this type of Appropriation is closely 
connected to the division of labor in society.319  Corresponding to this type of Appropriation, Weber 
argued is a second type, characterized by the ways in which the “material means of production” are 
appropriated within a socio-relational grouping.320
The ways in which both types of Appropriation (Appropriation of labor services and 
Appropriation of the material means of production) are conducted and proceed in their course of 
development have enormously significant implications for an economy, and the society within which it is 
ordered and structured.
   
321
                                                                                                                                                                           
to the tangible or intangible “things” from whence they arise. Rather, it is the specific ways in which these things are 
(or can be) put to use, their “useful services” (Nutzleistungen) that are the “opportunities” they present.  See id. at 
68-9. 
  To use Weber’s earlier terminology, particular modes of Appropriation 
produce characteristic types of Economic Order, i.e. characteristic types of Dispositional Power 
allocations within a society.   
314   See id. 
315   See id. 
316   See id. at 351-54. 
317   See id. 
318   See id. at 114-50. 
319   See id. 
320   See id. 
321   See id. 
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Moreover, through their influence on Dispositional Power allocations within a society, distinctive 
types of Appropriation differentially impact the ways in which valued goods and services may be used to 
achieve particular economic goals.  In other words, differing types of Appropriation result in (1) differing 
types of Dispositional Power allocations, and (2) differing Types of Demand-Satisfaction within a society.    
In the 1920 Manuscripts, Weber drew a distinction between two economic purposes for which 
appropriated Dispositional Powers over goods and services might be acquired and used: (1) 
administration and consumptive sustenance of a “budgetary unit” (Householding, Haushalt), and (2) 
acquisition of additional Dispositional Powers (Profit-Earning, Erwerben).  These correspond to differing 
methods of valuing the Dispositional Powers available, and differing ways of regarding the total value 
available for use over a given period of time.  For the budgetary unit, this total value is its “property” 
(Vermögen). 322   For purposes of Profit-Earning activity, this total value is the available “capital” 
(Kapital). 323  These differing conceptions of the total value of Dispositional Powers over goods and 
services correspond to differing types of economic action, according to Weber.324
To summarize, then, there are multiple distinct modes of Appropriation, modes that are 
influenced by the material nature of what is appropriated at the same time that they are influenced by the 
Order to which the appropriating members of a social relationship orient themselves in structuring their 
relationship.  Culture, social structure, and materiality are all in play in this complex story of 
Appropriation.  Distinct modes of Appropriation, in turn, have vastly differing economic effects within 
society, effects that manifest themselves in differing allocations of Dispositional Power and differing 
modes of Demand-Satisfaction.  Furthermore, distinct modes of valuing appropriated goods and services 
(as household “property” or as profit-earning “capital”) contribute to economic effects by influencing the 
way these goods and services are used. 
 
This is a rich and nuanced theory of the economy and of social relationships, a theory that 
addresses these social phenomena in each of their three crucial dimensions: structural, material, and 
symbolic.  It is a sociological theory of property, one that enables explanations of structural states and 
dynamic processes, a theory that is capable of addressing property-relations and their implications in a 
moment of time, and across time.    
 
                                                     
322   In this section of the 1920 Manuscripts, Weber references legal distinctions between “ownership” (Eigentum), 
possession (Bestiz), and the broader category of “property,” while imputing to these distinctions his own economic-
sociological content.  This is hard to see in the English translation, however.  In a note, Weber clarified the 
distinction between ownership and property: although both involve appropriated opportunities with respect to 
tangible and intangible things, the key to “ownership” is the existence of a legal order that guarantees stable 
possession and transfer across generations through inheritance.  See id. at 87, 89. 
323   See id. at 86-100.   
324   See id. 
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E.  Topics for Further Research: The Relationship to Domination and Class 
 
A question that has already been foreshadowed in this article concerns the relationship between 
Weber’s theory of property, on the one hand, and his theories of Domination and class, on the other.  
Before concluding, I will briefly survey Weber’s discussions pertaining to this question, leaving fuller 
treatment to a later date.   
In both the 1914 and 1920 Manuscripts, Weber drew a clear distinction between Appropriation 
and Dispositional Powers, on the one hand, and Domination (Herrschaft) on the other hand. 325  He 
nevertheless repeatedly noted that these may be closely connected in concrete reality.  In his manuscript 
addressing the relationship of Domination and Legitimacy, Weber stated that “control (Verfügung) over 
economic goods, i.e. economic power (Macht), is a frequent, often fully-intended consequence of 
Domination, as well as one of its [Domination’s] most important means.”326  Nevertheless, he went on to 
state that, while the uneven distribution of economic power rooted in Appropriation may contribute to 
Domination and result from Domination, such economic power should be analytically distinguished from 
Domination.327
In the 1920 Manuscripts, Weber defined Domination as “the probability that a command with a 
given specific content will be obeyed by a given group of persons.”
 
328  Domination is thus connected to 
the giving of rules for action, and therefore to a hierarchically-structured Order in the sense described in 
the Logos Essay.329  Logically, it would seem that in any case where a closed social relationship has 
resulted in an Order that is enforced by a person or persons in authority, i.e. in any case where an 
“Organization” in Weber’s sense has emerged,330
This logical implication is borne out by Weber’s multiple discussions of Domination.  An 
Organization can embrace everything from the patriarchal household (with the pater as owner and 
authority) to the patrimonial “manor,” feudal “fiefs” and “benefices” – distinctive types of Domination 
rooted in a Grundherr’s Appropriation and distribution of both land and authority – and on to modern 
bureaucratic “states” and corporations, with their characteristic patterns of Appropriation and Domination.  
 both Domination and Appropriation will be present, at 
least to some extent.   
                                                     
325   “Domination” is the conventional translation for Weber’s Herrschaft.  However, it is interesting to note that 
Weber’s teacher Theodor Mommsen approved the English “sovereignty” as the translation for that term.  See THE 
HISTORY OF ROME, BOOK I: THE PERIOD ANTERIOR TO THE ABOLITION OF THE MONARCHY, Chapter 1 (William 
Purdie Dickson translation 1894).  This translation, especially Book 1, is particularly valuable because Mommsen 
reviewed it, made comments on it, and approved its final version.  See id., Translator’s Preface. 
326   See id. at 942. 
327   See id. at 942-46. 
328   Id. at 53; see also id. at 212-301, 941 et seq. 
329   See supra note 249 and accompanying text. 
330   See Weber, supra note 8, at 48-50. 
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Thus, while ownership of another’s labor and person (i.e. slavery) may be the most intuitive area of 
overlap between Appropriation and Domination, this overlap is bound to occur in a much wider variety of 
cases, as Weber’s explications reveal.331
Turning finally to Weber’s concepts of “class” and “status,” we see that he draws a direct 
connection between these phenomena and property.  Property is frequently discussed in the outline 
concerning “Status Groups and Classes” in the 1920 Manuscripts,
 
332 and it is a dominant theme in the 
“Class, Status, Party” essay of the 1914 Manuscripts.333  Indeed, one of Weber’s three ideal types of class 
is defined by the possession of valued goods and services: it is labeled a “possessory-class” 
(Besitzklasse).334
Weber’s “classes” are not communities, social relationships, or groups; rather, they are defined by 
a shared “class situation.”
   
335  A shared class situation is a common set of conditions that is, in whole or at 
least in part, determined by shared rights and privileges with respect to the use, possession or ownership 
of property; this shared set of property-related conditions, in turn, produces a shared set of limitations on 
the possibilities for social action.336  “Possession and lack of possession (Besitzlosigkeit) are, therefore, 
the basic categories of all class situations,” Weber bluntly stated.337
Even status – a claim to social esteem based on education or inheritance – can rest on the 
“monopolistic Appropriation” of opportunities for acquisition; ironically, however, status can also rest on 
the abhorrence of such opportunities.
   
338  Status groups may arise out of shared possessory-classes.339  
More importantly, however, because it is a basis for communal identification, status can be a motivating-
force for the organized closure of a social relationship.340
                                                     
331    The overlap comes into striking focus when one compares Weber’s discussions of Appropriation and 
Domination.  See id. at 114-50, 212-301, 941 et seq.  These logical and empirical areas of overlap between 
Appropriation and Domination are further reinforced by the intriguing semantic connection noted previously (see 
note 217 and accompanying text): the Latin word for “ownership” (dominium) is the same as that used for 
mastership or lordship.  The “lord and master” (dominus, Herr) is he who possesses both ownership and authority 
(dominium, Herrschaft) over the household and its members.   
  In such a case, status is a causal factor in the 
emergence of property.  The “goods and services” around which a status group might close ranks would 
include such personal attributes as “honor” and “cultural prestige,” or certain privileged activities (e.g. 
332   See WEBER, supra note 8, at 302-7. 
333   See id. at 926-39. 
334   See id. at 302-7. 
335   See id. at 302, 927-32; see also supra note 243. 
336   See id. at 927-8. 
337   Id. at 927. 
338   See id. at 305-7, 935-6 
339   See id. at 305-7, 932-9.  In his outline in the 1920 Manuscripts, Weber stated that “[s]tatus groups are often 
created by possessory-classes.”  Id. at 307. 
340   See id. at 305-7, 932-9; see generally 941-1110.  Where status privilege is tied to rulership “rights,” as in the 
case of honoratiores, we again see the overlap between property and Domination in Weber’s theoretical framework.  
See, e.g., 948-52. 
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wearing special clothes or performing an occupation).  These are historical cases that Weber actually 
describes.341
While some may find the concept of property stretched too far by considering “honor” or 
“prestige” in such terms, it is worth remembering that “rights” to honor and reputation still exist in 
enforceable forms in contemporary society.  Cases relating to defamation and libel, and to other personal 
intangibles like privacy, are regularly countenanced in U.S. courts.  And even if they aren’t treated 
exactly like property, astute commentators have noted intriguing parallels to property.
   
342
Having now surveyed Weber’s sociological theory of property, and having briefly explored its 
close connections to his theories of Domination and class, it is appropriate to conclude. 
 
 
V.  Conclusion 
 
 Max Weber died on June 14, 1920.  “The earth had changed,” his wife Marianne wrote in the last 
line of her husband’s biography.343  And it is true that the political, social, and academic worlds have 
dramatically changed in the 90 years since Max Weber’s death.  The academic fields to which Weber 
directed his attention (sociology, economics, law, political science, public administration, history, and 
religious studies) are far more divided now than they were in his time.  The German nation-state that 
Weber so passionately defended has only recently begun to fully recover from the moral and political 
depths to which it sank after his death.  And technological innovations have wrought enormous changes 
in communication and social interaction.  In short, the social, economic, and political “life-worlds” of 
today are vastly different from those that Weber experienced.344
 And yet, I hope to have persuaded the reader that Max Weber’s sociological theory of property 
has much to offer to the sociology, law and economics of today.  Richard Swedberg has drawn recent 
attention to Weber’s “economic sociology of law.”
 
345
                                                     
341   See id. at 305-7, 932-9;  
   I wish to complement that project by drawing 
attention to Weber’s sociological theory of property, a theory that is richly-informed by Weber’s 
knowledge of law and his economic-historical research.   
342   See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 5 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).  Weber 
considered status-based Appropriation of honor and privilege to be generally hostile to the “hard bargaining” that 
characterizes a free market.  See WEBER, supra note 8, at 937.  We can see the parallels in today’s privacy and 
reputation “rights”: in most cases, these are not rights that people are interested in exchanging.  The case of celebrity 
endorsements is a clear exception. 
343   See MARIANNE WEBER, supra note 110, at 698. 
344   The concept of a “life-world” is borrowed from Alfred Schutz, who in turn borrowed it from Edmund Husserl.  
See, e.g., ALFRED SCHUTZ, ON PHENOMENOLOGY AND SOCIAL RELATIONS (Helmut R. Wagner ed. 1970). 
345   Max Weber’s Contribution to the Economic Sociology of Law, 2 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 61 (2006); The Case 
for an Economic Sociology of Law, 32 THEORY & SOC. 1 (2003). 
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 In tracing the developments of Weber’s thought in relation to property, I hope to have contributed 
to an “interpretive understanding” of his sociological theory of property.  By the time of his death, that 
theory was fully developed in a form that includes dynamic and structural elements, accounting for both 
materiality and “ideality” in economy and society.  I believe that Weber’s sociological theory of property 
stands ready to be utilized in understanding and explaining contemporary developments in property, 
particularly the phenomenon that may be the “great transformation” of our time: the emergence and 
expansion of “intellectual property.” 
 Weber began his scholarly work with a definition of property that is strikingly similar to the 
“bundle of rights” definitions so commonly used by contemporary law and economics scholars. 346
 According to this theory, property’s social conditions are minimal and pervasive, while varying 
enormously in their concrete manifestations and courses of development.  These social conditions are (1) 
the organized social closure of social relationships, which is (2) enabled by a valid Order.  Property’s 
social effects depend on a greater number of conditions, which again vary significantly in their concrete 
manifestations.  These conditions include: (1) the modes of enforcement and the inferred content of the 
Order (the concepts, rules, and principles comprising the Order), (2) the organized structure(s) of social 
relationship(s), (3) the number of co-existing organized social relationship and their modes of interaction, 
(3) the nature of the goods and services appropriated, and (4) the modes according to which appropriated 
goods and services are valued (household property or profit-earning capital).   
  
Passing through the phases described in this article as “legal” and “economic-historical,” and borrowing 
richly from them, Weber completed his investigations of property in his sociological phase.  By the end of 
his life, he had articulated a sociological theory of property, one that “endogenizes” property as a social 
phenomenon by explaining its social conditions and its social effects.   
 Organized social closure is a necessary, social condition for the existence of property, according 
to this theory.  Preeminent historical examples of this Weberian organized social closure are corporations, 
cities, guilds, and nation-states.  In describing the distinctive social-relationship patterns characteristic of 
these organizations, as well as their distinctive patterns of development, Weber laid a foundation for his 
work in Economy and Society.  That foundation began with his dissertation and ended with his lectures on 
General Economic History.  That Economy and Society is riddled with references to property-related 
concepts is therefore no accident: from beginning to end, property rested at the heart of Weber’s scholarly 
work in law, economic history, and sociology. 
 Weber viewed the economy as being “embedded” within society, in the sense that economic 
action is influenced by the patterns of directedness in meaning (i.e. culture), the relationship-structures, 
                                                     
346   See supra notes 48 and 100 and accompanying text.   
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and the material realities comprising the broader society within which that economic action takes place.347
 Economists and sociologists are reawakening to the importance of law.  Jurists have sophisticated 
theories of property, but these are not typically based in social science.  As a jurist and socio-economic 
theorist whose lifework continually returned to the theme of property, Weber stands poised to help answer 
the need for a theory of property that can address that phenomenon in all of its dimensions: social, 
economic-historical, and legal; structural, material, and symbolic.   
  
Occupying its position as part of the Formally-Correct Order – and thereby impacting the Empirically-
Valid Order – law influences patterns of directedness in meaning, social relationship structures, and their 
courses of development through history.  Property – which is, from this perspective, an indirect creature 
of law, but which can exist in de facto forms without law (or in spite of it) as a result of organized social 
closure oriented to an “as if” Order – connects meaning and structure to material reality.  Valued objects, 
most of which have come from the material world, are used, possessed, and/or “owned,” and this is 
enabled by socio-relational structures and patterns of directedness in meaning.  This use, possession or 
ownership, in turn, both enables and is enabled by, patterns of power and hierarchy that emerge and 




                                                     
347   See and compare Mark Granovetter, Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness, 91 
AM. J. SOC. 481 (1985); Greta R. Krippner & Anthony S. Alvarez, Embeddedness and the Intellectual Projects of 
Economic Sociology, 33 ANN. REV. SOC. 219 (2007).  Mark Granovetter’s influential use of the term 
“embeddedness” drew inspiration from Karl Polanyi’s Great Transformation.  See supra note 218. 
